Proceedings

11	1
1	MR. RYAN: Not to waste time, Judge,
2	and maybe I misunderstood Mr. Bell, but is 6081
3	moved into evidence?
4	MR. BELL: Yes.
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. RYAN: Okay.
7	MR. FAZIO: I don't know it was moved
8	into evidence.
9	THE COURT: He just did it. That's
10	why I wanted to make sure the record is clear.
11	It's coming into evidence. It's a
12	matter of marking. He had previously asked and it
13	comes in.
14	THE COURT OFFICER: Ready, Judge?
15	Step in, please. All rise. Jury entering.
16	(Jury entered.)
17	THE COURT: Please be seated.
18	Jurors, at this time I'd like to thank
19	you for participating in this trial. You have
20	been diligent in your efforts to be here each day.
21	I apologize for getting started a
22	little later than I wanted to. I had some matters
23	I had to deal with and I apologize, but I want to
24	thank you on behalf of the People of the State of
25	New York, and I'm sure all the litigants and the

lawyers here, for your attentiveness.

Jurors, you've heard all the evidence. You've heard the arguments of counsel, which are not evidence, but crystallize that evidence into a format known as a summation or closing argument, and now it's time for me to instruct you on what the law is and for you to take this verdict sheet that we're going to give you shortly and answer the questions, and by that, come up with a verdict in weighing and evaluating this case.

You recall when we started this case I told you that there are a couple of basic principles that you must comport yourselves with.

One is you must accept the law as I give it to you. You cannot use any other source or personal knowledge of what you believe the law is.

You take it whether you agree with it or not, just as I have to take the law as it is whether I agree with it or not when I do a bench trial, a judge-alone trial. So too you, as jurors, have to accept the law as we give it to you.

Please don't conclude anything from any of my rulings that we favor either side in this matter. I stand here as a neutral umpire and

the -- deliberating over what law is and what ought go forward.

So, as I mentioned in the beginning,

So, as I mentioned in the beginning, you're not here keeping a ball score; you know, who got more objections sustained or -- that's immaterial.

Lastly, you should consider all of the testimony that I shall -- that I have admitted, and you are to weigh and evaluate the particular witnesses that came forward in using your common sense and your every day experience in ascertaining whether someone is truthful or not truthful, or less truthful, or just doesn't recollect the facts, or got it wrong, okay.

Just as you sit and evaluate people and you speak to them, so too, here, you were called upon to weigh and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses that came forward here, and you are to determine what weight they had, what interest they had in the case or lack of interest, any biases or prejudices they may have had, what their age, appearance, the manner in which they've testified.

These are factors you may consider.

There's no magic formula, but weighing and

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evaluating all of those things, you come to a conclusion.

Now, if, however, you found that anyone has willfully testified falsely as to one material fact that is an important matter, the law permits you to disregard entirely the testimony of that witness based upon the legal principle that one who testifies falsely as to one material fact is likely to testify falsely as to everything.

Now, you're not bound to do that. You may pick and choose so much of their testimony as you find worthy of belief and disregard that portion that you find not worthy of belief.

It is clearly up to you to weigh and evaluate each witness as he or she came forward, and the evidence that has been presented here, to ascertain whether it is true or false. That's what you're basically called upon to do here.

By this process you are first to decide, as you, the sole judges of the facts, you know, what witnesses you believe, what portion of their testimony you accept, and what weight you will give it.

Now, we mentioned this concept called the burden of proof, and the burden of proof that

the defendant was negligent and that that negligence of Ford was a substantial factor in causing the injury and death is upon the plaintiffs.

The burden of proving that the plaintiff Steven Motelson was negligent, and that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury or death, is upon the defendant Ford.

Okay. So, whoever has the burden of proof, whoever makes the allegation as to negligence on the part of the other, has that burden of proof.

Okay. So, the party having the burden of proof on a particular issue must establish his or her contention, or the company's contention on that issue, by what we call a fair preponderance of the credible, believable evidence.

Credible evidence means the testimony or exhibits that you find to be worthy of belief.

A preponderance of the evidence means the greater part of such evidence.

It doesn't mean the greater number of witnesses or the greater length of time taken by either side.

The phrase refers to the quality of

the evidence and the weight and affect that it has upon your minds.

The law requires that in order for a party to prevail on an issue on which he or she has the burden of proof, the evidence that supports the claim on that issue must appeal to you as being more nearly representing what happened than that which was opposed to that claim on that particular issue.

If it does not, or if it weighs so evenly that you're unable to say that there is a preponderance on either side, you must resolve the question against the party who had the burden of proof in favor of the opposing party.

Now, in a death action such as this, with reference to two of the plaintiffs, the decedents' estates are not held to as high a degree of proof as is required of an injured plaintiff who can describe what happened.

Thus, you are permitted a greater latitude in inferring the negligence on the part of the defendant from all of the evidence in this case.

If, from all the credible evidence in this case, you conclude that it is more probable

than not that the defendant Ford was negligent, and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury or deaths, you will find for the plaintiffs on that issue.

However, if that is not your decision, or if you find that the evidence is so evenly balanced that you cannot say that the greater weight of the evidence is on either side of these issues, then you will find for the defendant Ford and that they were not at fault.

On the issue of plaintiffs' fault, the burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiffs were negligent, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident.

If, considering all of the evidence, you decide that it is more probable than not that the plaintiffs were negligent, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing their injuries and death, you will find for the defendant on that issue.

If you cannot decide, or if the evidence is so evenly balanced and you cannot say that the greater weight of the evidence is on either side of the issue for the plaintiffs'

negligence, then you will find that the plaintiffs were not at fault.

Now, in considering this case, you may consider only the exhibits which have been admitted in evidence and the testimony of the witnesses that you've heard in this courtroom, and also, the evidence that you saw.

We had a lot of video depositions
here, and that testimony is also provided to you
for convenience on video because we couldn't get
some live witnesses here. That, too, may be
utilized by you in the same manner as if they were
here live.

Under our rules of practice, an examination before trial, those depositions, are taken under oath and are entitled to the equal consideration by you, notwithstanding the fact that they were taken before the trial and outside this courtroom.

However, arguments, remarks, and summation of the attorneys are not evidence, nor is anything that I say now or may have said with regard to the facts evidence.

You'll recall that certain witnesses were presented here, which the lawyers referred to

as experts, and the plaintiff had certain witnesses, experts: William Williams, Stephen Irwin, Jeremy Cummings, David Renfroe, Dr. DiTuri, Dr. Ortiz-Tulla, and Dr. Purow.

The defense experts presented were Dr. Geoffrey Germane, Richard Keefer, Ed Paddock, and Catherine Corrigan, who testified concerning their qualifications as experts in their respective fields and gave their opinions concerning issues in this case.

When a case involves a matter of science or art that requires a special knowledge or skill not ordinarily possessed by the average person, an expert is permitted to state his or her opinion for the information of the Court and, you, the jury.

The opinions stated by the expert who testified before you were based on particular sets of facts or as the expert had obtained -- or as the expert had obtained knowledge of them and testified to them before you.

Or, on occasion, the attorneys had used what we call a hypothetical. The attorneys questioned the experts and asked the experts to assume.

You may reject an expert's opinion if you find the facts to be different from those which form the basis for the opinion. You may also reject the opinion if, after careful consideration of all the evidence in the case, expert or other, you disagree with the opinion.

In other words, you are not required to accept an expert's opinion to the exclusion of the facts and circumstances disclosed by all other testimony.

Such an opinion is subject to the same rules concerning reliability as the testimony of any other witness. It is given to you to assist you in reaching a proper conclusion. It is entitled to so much weight as you find the expert's qualifications in the field warrant, and must be considered by you, but it is not controlling upon your judgment.

Now, we had other types of witnesses that came forward. The plaintiffs, obviously, who testified were Gary Motelson, Michael Motelson, Elissa Motelson, Gayle Lydell, and Enid Motelson.

And the defendant had certain corporate representatives who testified here.

Now, you may consider these witnesses

interested witnesses. An interested witness is not necessarily less believable than a disinterested witness.

The fact that he or she is interested in the outcome of the case does not mean that he or she did not tell the truth. It is for you to decide from their demeanor -- from their demeanor on the stand, and from other tests which your experience dictates, whether or not the testimony has been influenced intentionally or unintentionally by their interest in the case.

You may, if you consider it proper under all the circumstances, not believe the testimony of such witness, even though it is not otherwise challenged or contradicted.

However, you are not required to reject the testimony of such witness, and may accept all or such part of his or her testimony that you find reliable, and reject those parts that you find not worthy of acceptance.

Now, we had some interested witnesses who were -- who were employees of the defendant here. The fact that the following witnesses:

Charles Adams, Victor DeClercq, Ed Paddock, Joel Perkins and Casey Mulder were employed by Ford

Motor Company, and that the testimony that you had -- had heard related to their employment relationship, may be considered by you in deciding whether the testimony of those witnesses in anyway was influenced by the employment relationship with Ford Motor Company.

There are several theories of
liability in this case, and one of them is
negligence. And negligence is a lack of ordinary
care. That is, it's a failure to use that degree
of reasonable -- that degree of care that a
reasonably prudent person or company would have
used under the same circumstances.

Negligence may arise from doing an act that a reasonably prudent person or company would not have done under the circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to do an act that a reasonably prudent person or company would have done under those same circumstances.

We've spoken about this term substantial -- it must be a substantial factor, and that's what we referred to as proximate cause.

An act or an omission is regarded as a cause of an injury or an accident if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,

that is, it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury.

There may be more than one cause of an injury, but to be substantial it cannot be slight or trivial. You may, however, decide that a cause is substantial even if you assign a relatively small percentage to it.

One of the other theories that has been presented is what we call strict liability. Now, a manufacturer or a distributor who sells a product in a defective condition is liable for injury which results from that product when the product is used for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose.

A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe, that is, if the product is so likely to be harmful to people and property that reasonable people who had actual knowledge of its potential for producing injury would conclude that it should not have been marketed in that condition.

A product may be defective as a result of a defective design or inadequate warnings or instructions. The burden of proving that the

product was defective and that the defect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injury is upon the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs claim that the 1998

Explorer designed by the defendant Ford was

defective because, one, the speed control system

was designed in such a way to cause a bind on the

date of the crash.

Two, its rear seat belt system could not (sic) unlatch and/or malfunction during the rollover incident.

Or three, its -- and three, its roof structure and front seat belt support system could malfunction during the rollover incident.

The defendant Ford denies that the 1998 Explorer was defectively designed in that the speed control system was adequate, and that the rear seat belt system was functioning, and that the roof structure and front seat belt support system were not defective and were reasonably safe.

A product is defectively designed if a reasonable person, who knew or should have known of the product's potential for causing injury and the feasible or alternative designs, would have

concluded that the product should not have been marketed in that condition.

Whether the product should have been marketed in that condition depends on the balancing of risks involved in using the product against the product's usefulness and its cost, and two, the risks, usefulness, and costs of the alternative designs as compared to the product the defendant did market.

It is not necessary to find that defendant knew of the product's potential for causing injury in order to determine that it was defectively designed.

It is sufficient that a reasonable person who did, in fact, know of the product's potential for causing injury, and of the available alternative designs, would have concluded that the product should not have been marketed in that condition.

The plaintiffs claim that the 1998

Explorer manufactured by defendant Ford was

defective because Ford failed to provide safety

warnings in that it failed to warn of the

potential of a stuck throttle and what a driver

should do if faced with a stuck throttle.

Ford denies that the 1998 Explorer

warnings were needed, and contends that the 1998

Explorer was not defective and was not -- and was reasonably safe.

The manufacturer of a product which is reasonably certain to be harmful if used by the

reasonably certain to be harmful if used by the way the manufacturer reasonably foresees is under a duty to use reasonable care to give adequate warnings of any danger known to it or that in the use of reasonable care it should have known and which the user of the product ordinarily would not discover.

Reasonable care means that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would use under the circumstances.

If you find that the vehicle was marketed and it was not defectively designed, or no warnings regarding safety hazards were necessary, or that safety warnings accompanying the product were adequate, then you will state that the product was not defective, and you need not proceed further on your deliberations on that particular issue.

If, however, you find that at the time the vehicle was marketed, the product was

defective in any of the ways that I've discussed, then you will proceed to consider whether the defect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or death; that is, whether a reasonable person would regard it as a cause of the injury or death.

If you find that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries, you need proceed no further in your deliberations on that particular issue.

Now, weighing all the circumstances and facts, you must consider the total responsibility, that is, the responsibility of both the plaintiffs and the defendant Ford which contributed to causing the accident, and determine what percentage is chargeable to each.

In your verdict you will state percentages you find. The total of that must equal 100 percent.

The manufacturer of a product which is reasonably certain to be dangerous if used in a way that a manufacturer should reasonably foresee it would be used, is under a duty to use reasonable care to give adequate warnings of any dangers known to it which could have -- which in

the use of reasonable care it should have known and which the user of the product ordinarily would not discover.

Reasonable care means that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person or company would use under those same circumstances.

Now, there's another claim here for what we call limited -- strike that -- for liability because of a breach of an implied warranty.

The law implies a warranty by a manufacturer that places a product on the market that is reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which the product is used.

If the product is not reasonably fit to be used for its ordinary purposes, that warranty is breached.

Plaintiff claims that defendant Ford's 1998 Explorer was not fit for its ordinary purposes because, one, the speed control cable system was designed in such a way as to cause a bind on the date of the crash. Two, that its seat belt system could unlatch and/or release during a rollover incident, and, three, its roof structure support system could malfunction during a rollover

incident.

Now, if you find that the product was fit for its ordinary purposes, you will find that there was no breach of warranty and you will find for Ford on that particular issue.

If you find that the 1998 Explorer was not fit for its ordinary purposes, you will find that Ford breached that implied warranty.

Now, Ford's compliance with the federal motor vehicle safety standard does not exempt Ford from liability, but you may consider compliance in evaluating that vehicle.

The defendant claims that some or all of Brian and Evan Motelson's claimed injuries were caused by their failure to use the available seat belts and that the plaintiff could -- and that the plaintiffs cannot recover for their injuries as a result thereof.

The defendant has the burden of proving that some or all of Brian and Evan Motelson's injuries, and/or Brian's death, was caused by the failure to use the available seat belts.

If you find that either Brian or Evan failed to use the available seat belt, and that

some of their injuries and/or death in the case of Brian, you may -- you may not make an award for those injuries which you find that Brian or Evan sustained because of such failure to use their seat belts.

You'll be given a verdict sheet containing several questions. First question is dealing with damages.

You're asked whether -- to insert total damages sustained by the plaintiffs; that is, the total damages both past and future, which you will itemize if you find damages.

The second question asks whether the defendant has proved some or all of plaintiffs' injuries and were they caused by the failure to use the available seat belt.

If you've answered yes to that second question, you will answer the next question which asks you to compute the amount of money which plaintiffs should be reduced because of plaintiffs' failure to use the available seat belt. In that instance you will put that in a percentage, what percentage should be diminished by failure to use a seat belt, if you should so find.

We have specific questions on the verdict sheet which ask -- first questions were each of the boys wearing their seat belts, and you'll answer those questions yes or no, and from there it follows.

Now, a person who is faced with an emergency and who acts without the opportunity to consider the alternatives is not negligent if he acts in a reasonably -- as a reasonably prudent person would act in that same emergency, even if it later appears that he did not make the safest choice or exercise the best judgment.

A mistake in judgment or wrong choice of action is not negligent if the person is required to act quickly because of danger.

This rule applies where a person is faced with a sudden condition which could not have been reasonably anticipated, provided that the person did not cause or contribute to the emergency by his own negligence.

If you find that Steven Motelson, who was the driver of the vehicle, was faced with an emergency, and that his response to the emergency was that of a reasonably prudent person, then you will consider -- then you will conclude that

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Steven Motelson was not negligent.

If, however, you find the situation facing Steven Motelson was not sudden, or should reasonably have been foreseen, or was created or contributed to by his own negligence, or that his conduct in response to the emergency was that -- was not that of a reasonably prudent person, then you may find that Steven Motelson was negligent.

If you find that Ford Motor Company was negligent, and that Ford's negligence contributed to causing the automobile accident in question, you must next consider whether the driver of -- Steven Motelson was also negligent, and whether Steven Motelson's conduct contributed to causing the automobile accident.

Here, the burden is on the defendant to prove that Steven Motelson was negligent and that his negligence contributed to causing the accident.

If you find that Steven Motelson was not negligent, or if negligent, that his negligence did not contribute to causing the accident, you must find -- find for the plaintiff -- you must find that the plaintiff was not at fault, and you must go no further on your

consideration -- you must then go to consider damages, if any, submitted by plaintiff.

If, however, you find that Steven

Motelson was negligent, and that his negligence

contributed to causing the accident, you must then

apportion the fault between Steven Motelson and

Ford Motor Company.

Weighing all the facts and circumstances, you must consider their total fault; that is, the fault of both Steven Motelson and Ford Motor Company, and determine what percentage of fault is chargeable to each.

In your verdict you state percentages that you find, and those percentages must equal 100 percent.

I'm going to instruct you on damages at this time, and you must not take from my -- my charge that I'm suggesting what you are to find or that you should find for the plaintiff.

It is for you to decide on the evidence presented and the rules of law that I've given to you whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant.

If you decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover from the defendant, you

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need not consider damages. Only if you decide that the plaintiffs, or any of them, is entitled to recover, will you then consider the measure of damages.

If you find that the plaintiffs are

If you find that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendant, you must render a verdict in a sum of money that will justly and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for all of their losses resulting from the injuries they sustained.

If you decide that Ford is liable,

Gary Motelson and/or Steven Motelson and/or Evan

Motelson and/or Brian Motelson are entitled to

recover a sum of money which will justly and

fairly compensate each of them for any of the

injuries of conscious pain and suffering to date

caused by them.

And, of course, as to Brian, conscious pain and suffering would be from the time of the crash until the following day when he died.

In determining that amount, if any, to be awarded, Gary and/or Evan and/or Brian, and/or Steven, up until Brian and Steven's death, for pain and suffering, you must take into consideration the effects that the plaintiffs'

injuries have had on the plaintiffs' ability to enjoy life.

Loss of enjoyment of life involves the loss of the ability to perform daily tasks, to participate in the activities which were part of the person's life before the injury, and to experience the pleasures of life.

However, a person suffers the loss of enjoyment of life only if that person is aware at some level of the loss that he has sustained.

If you find that Gary and/or Evan, and/or Brian, and/or Steven up until their deaths, as a result of their injuries, suffered some loss of the ability to enjoy life, and that Gary or Evan or Brian and Steven were aware of it at some level of loss, you may take that into consideration in determining the amount to be awarded to the plaintiffs for pain and suffering up until the present.

A parent has a right to the services of a child. If you find that the plaintiffs' mother, Elissa Motelson, and the father, Gary Motelson, are entitled to recover, you will award them damages for the pecuniary loss of which you find was sustained by the loss of Evan Motelson's

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services.

Take into consideration the services performed by a child before the occurrence. In considering those services performed by a child before the occurrence, you must evaluate what they did before, their age, their health, their skill, their training, their industry, the experience of the child, and the extent to which the injuries he sustained disabled him from performing those services and, with reasonable certainty, will disable him from performing services in the future until the child becomes 18 years of age.

Based upon these factors, you will award the reasonable value of the child's services which the parents have been and will be deprived of as a result of those injuries.

Plaintiff Michael Motelson is the administrator of the estate of Steven Motelson. Plaintiff makes two claims here. One, the first claim, seeks damages resulting from the death of Steven Motelson, and second, the claim seeks damages for the injuries and losses which were sustained by Steven Motelson before he died.

You must separately consider each of those claims. As to the first claim, the damages

are the amount that you will find to be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, that is, the economic loss resulting from Steven Motelson's death to each of the persons for whom the claim is brought.

Those persons are his wife, Enid

Motelson; his sons, Gary and Michael Motelson, and
their daughter, Gayle Lydell.

The law limits damages resulting from Steven Motelson's death to pecuniary issues; monetary injuries, monetary loss.

You may not consider or make any award for sorrow, mental anguish, injury to feelings or for loss of companionship.

You must determine the economic value of Steven Motelson to his wife, Enid Motelson; to the sons, Gary and Michael; and to his daughter, Gayle Lydell, on July 1st, 2000 when Steven Motelson died.

In determining that economic value, you should consider the character, the habits, the ability of Steven Motelson, the circumstances and condition of Enid Motelson, Gary Motelson, and Michael Motelson and Gayle Lydell, the services that Steven would have performed for them, the

portion of his earnings that Steven would have spent for the future for the care and support of Enid, Gary, Michael and Gayle, the age and life expectancy of Steven, and the age and life expectancies of Enid, Gary, Michael and Gayle.

You should also consider the amount, if any, by which Steven Motelson, if he had lived, would have been inherited from him provided that you find at least one of Enid, Gary, Michael or Gayle would have been alive to inherit from him had Steven not died on July 1st, 2000.

Now, Steven Motelson at the time of his death was 60 years of age, and, according to life expectancy tables, had a life expectancy of 19.4 years additional time.

Now, life expectancy tables are simply statistical averages. A person might live longer or die sooner than the time indicated by those tables.

The figures I've just mentioned to you are not controlling upon you, but may be considered by you together with all the other evidence you've heard concerning Steven's habits and health and his employment activities prior to his death in determining what his prospective life

expectancy was and what they were at the time of Steven Motelson's death.

You must decide what portion of his earnings Steven Motelson would have spent for the care and support of Enid, Michael, Gary and Gayle in making your decision.

In that regard, you must consider the amount Steven Motelson earned per week or per month or per year prior to his death. The part of those earnings that Steven would have contributed to the care and support of Enid, Gary, Michael and Gayle, and the pattern of those contributions, the position that Steven had with the company at the time he died, his prospects for advancement and the probabilities with respect to his future earnings, the risks of his occupation, the condition of his health, the length of time that it would have reasonably been expected that he would have reasonably been expected to continue working.

As to that last factor, the work expectancy of Steven Motelson was, according to work expectancy tables, to be another 5.7 years from the date of his death.

However, again, that figure, like the

life expectancy figure that I mentioned earlier, is only a statistical average and is furnished simply as a guide.

In determining what portion of his available earnings Steven Motelson would have applied in the future to the care and support of his children, you should consider that Steven Motelson was not legally obligated to contribute to the support of any child who had become 21 years of age or older.

However, Steven Motelson could have stopped supporting the child under age 21 -- he could have decided to support them to an older age beyond age 21.

Okay. If on the evidence you deem it reasonably probable that Steven Motelson would have contributed to the support of his children who were beyond age 21, you may use the date of termination of support of that child as a date which was earlier or later than 21.

Now, obviously, they're all over age 21, and the instruction that we're giving here speaks to someone who is less.

Obviously, he doesn't have an obligation beyond 21, but his -- but by his habits

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and by the testimony, you can conclude whether he would have contributed to them beyond that time.

As I've stated, the economic value of Steven Motelson to his wife and children and grandchildren is something to be decided by you. That value is incapable of exact proof.

Taking into account all of the factors that I've discussed, you must use your own common sense and sound judgment based on the evidence in determining the amount of the economic loss suffered by Enid, Gary, Michael, Gayle, and Steven's four grandchildren.

The amount you decide as to the amount of economic loss sustained by Enid, Gary, Michael and Gayle must represent the full amount of such loss without reduction to present value. You must also decide the period of years for which that amount is intended to provide.

As to the claims for damages sustained by Steven Motelson before he died, which is the second claim I mentioned here earlier, plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate for the pain and suffering actually endured by Steven Motelson during such time as he was conscious from the

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moment of the incident until the moment of death.

In addition, the plaintiff is entitled to recover those reasonable expenses which were paid or incurred by Steven Motelson's estate for his treatment and care. I don't believe we have a claim for that here, so you disregard that.

There's no question as to that. So -- all right.

I'll cover that in the verdict sheet.

Plaintiff Gary Motelson is the administrator of the estate of Brian Motelson.

Here, plaintiff makes two claims. The first claim seeks damages resulting from the death of Brian Motelson, and the second claim seeks damages for the injuries and losses which were sustained by Brian Motelson before he died.

You must separately consider each of these claims. As to the first claim, damages are the amount that you find to be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, that is, the economic loss resulting from Brian Motelson's death to each of the persons for whom the claim is brought. Those persons are his father, Gary, and his mother, Elissa.

The law limits damages resulting from Brian Motelson's death to pecuniary injuries.

That means economic loss. You may not consider or make any award for sorrow, mental anguish, injuries to feelings or loss of companionship.

You must determine the economic value of Brian Motelson to his parents prior to July 1, 2000 -- well, it's July 2, 2000 when Brian died.

In determining that economic value, you should consider the character, habits, ability of Brian, the circumstances and conditions of his parents, the services that Brian would have performed for them, the age and life expectancy of Brian, and the age and life expectancies of his parents.

As I've stated before, this is economic value as to Brian to his parents that you must decide. The value obviously is incapable of exact proof.

Taking into account all the factors that I've previously discussed, you must use your own common sense and sound judgment based on the evidence in determining the amount of economic loss suffered by his parents.

The amount you decide must be the full economic loss sustained by them without reduction to present value, and you must also decide the

period of years for which that amount is intended to provide compensation.

As I've stated, the claims for damages sustained by Brian Motelson before he died, that is, those -- that is the second claim that I mentioned.

There the plaintiff is entitled to recover such sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate for the pain and suffering endured by Brian Motelson during such time as he was conscious from the moment this incident started until the moment of his death.

With respect to any of the plaintiffs' injuries or disabilities that you find to be permanent, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the future pain and suffering and disability and loss of enjoyment of life.

In this regard here you consider the period of time that the plaintiff can be expected to live. In accordance, again, with these life expectancy tables, Evan Motelson had a life expectancy of 61.4 years and Gary Motelson has a life expectancy of 32.7 years. That's additional years from this date.

Such a table, however, provides

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nothing more than a statistical average. It neither guarantees that the plaintiffs will live an additional 61 or 32 years respectively, or means that they will live longer or less.

Okay. Life expectancy figures, as

I've mentioned before, are statistical averages,
and they are things that you may consider.

However, you also may consider other factors from
your own experience and from the evidence that
you've heard concerning each of their respective
health, their habits, their employment, their
activities in deciding what those plaintiffs'
present life expectancies are.

You may find that the plaintiffs and the decedents are entitled to recover from the defendant. You must also include in your verdict damages for any mental suffering; emotional, psychological injuries. These are subsumed in emotional distress into the pain and suffering questions. That's correct.

MR. ROTHENBERG: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: There's not a separate question for that. Now, let me take a pause here.

Is there any question as to the

ı	Sury Charge 31/8
1	verdict sheet?
2	MR. ROTHENBERG: Yes, your Honor.
3	MR. CECALA: I think we have just a
4	couple.
5	THE COURT: Give us sit tight,
6	jurors. Why don't we step outside and see if
7	there is a technical correction that we need to
8	make.
9	(Whereupon, a discussion was held off
10	the record in chambers. Following said
11	discussion, the Court and all attorneys returned
12	to the courtroom.)
13	THE COURT: Jurors, take ten minutes.
14	We have some technical questions, and we have to
15	redo the sheets, okay, and then we'll give you
16	further instruction.
17	THE COURT OFFICER: Step out, please.
18	(Jury exited.)
19	(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
20	THE COURT OFFICER: Remain seated.
21	THE COURT: Bring them in.
22	THE COURT OFFICER: Step in, please.
23	Jury entering.
24	(Jury entered.)
25	THE COURT: Please be seated. Ladies
- 1	•

and Gentlemen of the Jury, I had misspoke earlier when I said that in considering any damages to the what contributions, if any, Steven Motelson may have given to his family, I included the grandchildren. You should not consider the grandchildren however. Only the children would be considered. Okay?

Let's give a verdict sheet to juror number one. Traditionally, the first person in the first seat acts as a foreperson, but it's up to you to elect your own foreperson.

The foreperson has no greater duties than anyone else, but you've got to fill out the form, check off the boxes. Okay. It's not a hard thing.

If you open to the first page, I'm going to go through a few things with you, and these are the questions that you're going to be receiving shortly, okay?

Now, in filling out this special verdict sheet, there are stop and start points. Read the instructions carefully. Follow the instructions exactly, okay, because it is important that we don't have an inconsistent verdict because you didn't follow the

instructions. So follow them carefully.

Don't be afraid by it. It's -hopefully we've worked long enough on this that
we've got it down pat at this point, but the
questions are -- are specific.

Now, you, as jurors, the first six of you are going to deliberate on this case, and under New York law all we need is five out of six.

In other words, one of you could be a dissenter from the other five and still have a verdict as to a particular question. Answering it yes or no, and these are a series of questions, yeses or nos. We give you a pen. You check off the box yes or no in the space provided. So there are a whole series of questions, and we'll talk about how you ought do that. Okay.

The alternates, we're going to separate you. We're still going to give you lunch, and we are going to ask that you not deliberate because if somebody gets sick, we may have to throw you into the mix this afternoon.

Okay. So that's why you're still here.

Let's go through this. Open to the first page -- and you'll have an opportunity to look at this as we go along. Do we have extras

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1	here?
2	THE CLERK: Yes.
3	THE COURT: How many extras do we
4	have?
5	THE CLERK: I have three for right
6	now.
7	MR. BELL: Judge, I can share. We
8	have a couple back here.
9	THE COURT: Give every other juror a
10	verdict sheet, and then we'll collect these back
11	from you. Give each one if you have enough.
12	We'll make more copies.
13	Okay. Just follow along. It's rather
14	lengthy. We don't typically do that, but it's
15	rather lengthy.
16	Go to the first flip over to the
17	first page. Okay. It will read page number two.
18	These are the questions that we want you to ask
19	answer in sequence. A okay. Now, there's an
20	"A" question and a "B" question, and then we're
21	going to get into numbers.
22	Okay. Was Brian Motelson wearing a
23	seat belt at the time of the accident? Yes or no.
24	We need a minimum of five out of six
25	of you or six out of six. You check off the box

records. Okay.

all six jurors agree or five out of six if you have five out of six. You then write in the name of the person that disagrees with the others.

Okay. We don't take any penalty against you. It's just we need this for our records. Okay.

Then you go onto Question B. Was Evan Motelson wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. Again, yes or no. All six agree, five out of six, name of the dissenter. Okay.

Now, if you've answered yes to either or both "A" and/or "B," proceed to the next question, which is question one, two, and three. However, if you've answered no to both of those questions, A and B, then you go to question four. You skip over the next one. Okay.

But assuming you've answered that yes, they were wearing their seat belts, let's go to question one. Okay. And I don't mean that as any suggestion, but I want to go through each question.

Question One: Was the rear seat belt system defectively designed? Yes or no.

Okay. And, again, your instructions. If you said yes, proceed to "B." Okay.

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Jury Charge Was that a substantial factor in causing the injury to Evan Motelson, yes or no. Okay. If you had said "no," you just jump over to the number two question, which is on the following page. In this instance here we have a "C" question. One-C reads: Was that a substantial factor in causing the death of Brian Motelson. Okay. Now, in each question that we're going verbiage: Was that a substantial factor.

to be going through, you're going to have the same

In order to find liability, it's a two-prong test. You have to find either negligence or a defect of some sort, and that defect or negligence caused a substantial factor. So you're going to have these "A" and "B" questions as we go along, okay, and they would both have to be yes in order to find liability.

If you find there is a defect but it didn't cause the injury or the death, and you said no, that means there's no liability as against the defendant.

If you said "no, no" obviously there's no liability as against the defendant.

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1	Okay. So, you are going to see that
2	substantial factor issue coming up in every
3	question that we go through in the future. Okay.
4	Proceed to Question Two. Okay.
5	Follow the instructions.
6	Question Two has an "A" portion: Was
7	Ford's 1998 Explorer's rear seat belt system not
8	reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which
9	they were used. Yes or no.
10	And, again, we need the vote tally as
11	to each. If yes, you go to "B." Was that a
12	substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs'
13	injuries and/or death.
14	Again, all those "B" questions are
15	going to be substantial factor, substantial
16	factor, substantial factor. Okay?
17	Go onto the next page. Was Ford Motor
18	Company negligent in failing to use reasonable
19	care in designing, inspecting, and testing the
20	rear seat belt system in the 1998 Ford Explorer.
21	Yes or no.
22	Okay. Again, if you said yes, you go
23	to "B." If you said no, you bump over to the next
24	question. Okay.

Francesca Bush Senior Court Reporter

Was that a substantial factor in

causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or death.

4-A, Was the front seat belt system defectively designed. All right. We had the rear, now we're talking about the front. Yes or no.

Again, if you said yes to "A," you go to "B." If you said no, you bump over to page five. B, of course, was that a substantial factor in causing Steven Motelson's death.

5-A, Was Ford's 1998 Explorer's front seat belt system not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which it was used. Yes or no. And the vote.

And if you said yes, you go to the "B" section. Was that a substantial factor in causing Steven Motelson's injuries and death. Yes or no. Bump over if you had said no.

And if you went through "B" to question six on the next page, which reads -- 6-A, Was Ford Motor Company negligent in failing to use reasonable care in designing, inspecting, and testing the front seat belt system in the 1998 Ford Explorer. Yes or no. The vote.

If you said yes, the "B "section. Was that negligence a substantial factor in causing

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Steven Motelson's injury and death. Yes or no.

Bumping over to the next page, Question 7-A, Was the roof support system defectively designed. Yes or no. The vote. you would go to substantial factor. If you said no, you'd bump over to the following page. Okay.

Question eight, Was Ford's 1998 Explorer's roof support system not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such system is used? Yes or no. The vote. The section -- if you said yes -- was that a substantial factor in causing Steven Motelson's injuries and death.

And if you said no, you would bump over to question nine. 9-A reads: Was Ford Motor Company negligent in failing to use reasonable care in designing and inspecting and testing the roof support system of the 1998 Ford Explorer. Yes or no. Your vote. "B" section, Was that a substantial factor in causing Steven Motelson's injuries or death. You said no, you would bump over to the tenth question.

10-A, Was the 1998 Ford Explorer's speed control cable system defectively designed. Yes or no. The vote. The "B" section, Was that a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs'

injuries and/or death. And if you said no, you would have bumped over to question 11-A.

Was the speed control cable system not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such product is used. Yes or no. The "B" section if you said yes, Was that a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or death. Okay. If you said no, you would bump over to question 12.

12-A, Was Ford Motor Company negligent in failing to use reasonable care in designing, inspecting, and testing the speed control cable system of the 1998 Ford Explorer. Yes or no. The "B" section, Was this negligence a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or death. If you said no, you would go over to 13-A.

Was Ford Motor Company negligent in failing to give adequate warnings of any dangers known to it of the design of the speed control cable system of the 1998 Explorer vehicle or which it -- for which in the use of reasonable care it should have known. We will carat that in.

And the "B" section, Was that a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or death.

If you had said no, you would bump over to the instruction sheet. Okay. Okay. I have to make a tailor on this here. You don't proceed to Question 14. You do, but you have to read the instruction sheet first.

Okay. On page 16 we have instructions: Now, if you've answered yes to one or more of the following questions, and those are all of them, 1 through 13-B.

Now, if you had said no to an "A" section, you wouldn't have a "B" section, okay. If you got to the "B" section and said yes/yes, that's when you move on, and the next section would cover comparative negligence.

Okay. So, if you have yes/yes as to any one of those 13 questions, then you move on, okay. If you said no to all of them, okay, from the "B" section, then you don't proceed. Okay. But any one of them moves you over. Okay.

So, and at that point you would stop.

You tell the court officer you have a verdict. So
if you have yes/yes as to any of those liability
questions as against Ford, you then ask the
question if that -- meaning you have found Ford
liable.

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Now, we ask, Was Steven Motelson negligent in operating the 1998 Ford Explorer. Yes or no. And the "B" section, Was that negligence a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries and/or deaths. Yes or no.

And in this instance we have a "C" section, okay. It says, What percentage of responsibility is chargeable to Ford Motor Company and what percentage chargeable to Steven Motelson, and those two numbers have to equal 100 percent.

Okay.

So, you know, let's assume you got here. Any two numbers, you know, 60/40, 70/30, 50/50 -- I'm not suggesting anything -- but those two numbers have to equal 100 percent.

All right. Okay. Let's go down. So if you've gotten through that, that means you have found liability as against Ford and possibly against Motelson. If you said no as to him, then we move onto damages anyway, because now we're going to evaluate damages.

And in this instance your answers are going to be in dollar amounts or none if you decide not to make an award.

Okay. State the amount of damages

awarded to Evan Motelson for pain and suffering up until the date of your verdict.

Now, when we say, "up until the date of your verdict," we're talking about from the date of this accident up until today. We consider that the past because there's another question which deals with the future, and that starts today and it pushes out.

And that was what we were talking about with these life expectancy tables, of what you estimate they may live or not live, and that's how you utilize that information that we gave you earlier.

So, again, we need a vote; all six of you or five out of six. And any dissenting vote we need the name.

And, State the amount of future damages, if any, awarded to Evan Motelson for the permanent effect of his injuries, and further pain and suffering, from the time of your verdict, okay, to the time of Evan Motelson could be expected to live. And then state the period of years and such amount which is intended to provide compensation.

Now, don't do math. Okay. What do I

mean by that? Don't multiply. Don't divide. We need gross numbers. We don't need you doing algebraic formulas. We don't need you saying, Gee, he'll live another 50 years times "X" number of years. "X" times 50 equals -- you know. You could do that as a means of calculating, but you don't put that here.

So when we say number of years, we're talking about how long you -- if you answer this question -- how long you anticipate he's going to live using, as a guide, the statistical tables that we gave you earlier. Okay.

Everybody understand that? Okay. So it's a gross amount. It's not "X" number of dollars per year or per month or whatever. It's a gross amount, okay, over a period of time, if you decide.

And, of course, if you decide not to make an award, you put in the word "none" as to any of these questions where it says "amount." If you decide not to make an award, you write in the word "none," N-O-N-E.

Okay. The "B" question, 16-B, State the amount of damages, if any, awarded to Evan Motelson for the costs of future medical

treatment, care, and medication from the time of your verdict until that time that Evan Motelson 3 could be expected to live, and then state the period of years over which that amount is intended to provide compensation. Again, a gross amount if you decide to make an award, or "none" if you decide not to make an award. And if you decide to make an award, over what period of years do you anticipate that

> Now, special instruction before the next question. If you found in Question B -remember going back -- that Evan Motelson was wearing a seat belt, do not answer 16-C. Then proceed to Question 17.

money to be utilized that you award. Okay.

However, if you found -- 16-C, If you found in Question B that Evan Motelson was not wearing a seat belt, what percentage of his injuries were a result of that failure to use the seat belt.

Okay. In this instance you will determine that had he been wearing a seat belt, he might have been, you know, protected. Or, if he wasn't wearing it, it caused further injuries than had he been wearing the seat belt, okay, and that

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is something that you have to determine; what percentage if he was not wearing a seat belt, if you made that determination that he is not, would reduce the amount of injuries that he would have had. Okay.

And then, consequently, that gets applied to the dollar amounts, if any, that you award. We take care of that. We just need the percentage if you decide he was not wearing a seat belt.

If you said he was wearing a seat belt, then skip over this and then go to 17, okay?

And 17-A basically speaks to the same issue, but to, you know, Brian is -- is deceased, so we speak of the Estate of Brian Motelson for the conscious pain and suffering, if any, experienced by Brian Motelson prior to his death.

Okay. He died the following day, so it's that window that we're talking about. And if you decide to put in the word "none," put in that word "none." And, again, we need a five out of six of you to make those votes.

Now, on the next instruction, it's the same as the previous one. If you found in Question A that Brian Motelson was wearing a seat

belt, don't answer 17-B and proceed to the following instructions which are at the bottom of the page.

But if you found in Question A that
Brian Motelson was not wearing a seat belt, what
percentage of his injuries were a result of the
failure to wear that seat belt.

Same concept that applies to Brian as it did to Evan. If he was not wearing his seat belt, what additional injuries do you ascertain he might have -- he sustained as opposed to had he been wearing it.

Instructions, If you have answered yes to any of the following questions -- and that goes through all these liability issues, 4 through 14-B -- then proceed to questions 18 and 26.

Okay. That's the next -- through the end basically.

So, now we talk about Gary Motelson.

State the amount of damages awarded to Gary

Motelson for pain and suffering up until the date
of your verdict. If you decide not to make an

award, you put in the word "none" there. Okay.

And, again, we need five out of six of you to

reach that verdict. Hopefully, all people will --

you know, verdicts will be unanimous if you can.

Question 19, State the amount of future damages, if any, awarded to Gary Motelson for the permanent effect of his injuries and pain and suffering from the time of your verdict to the time that Gary Motelson could be expected to live, and then state the period of years over which such amount is intended to provide compensation.

Again, if you decide none, you put in that word. If you decide an amount, you put in the gross amount. Again, don't do math. You're looking at the total number of years that he could be expected to live and what compensation are you going to award for that, if any.

Question 20, State the amount of damages, if any, awarded to Gary Motelson for the costs of future medical treatment, care, and medication from the time of your verdict to the time that Gary Motelson could be expected to live, and then state the period of years over which such amount is intended to provide compensation.

If you decide to make an award, you will insert the -- not to make an award, you will insert the word "none."

"Question 21, State the amount of

damages, if any, awarded to Elissa Motelson for her loss of services, society, and affection as a result of her husband Gary Motelson's injuries.

If you decide to make no award, put in the word "none." If you decide to make an award, dollar amount, number of years, okay.

Moving onto 22: State the amount of damages, if any, awarded to Elissa Motelson and Gary Motelson for the loss of services as a result of injuries to their son, Evan Motelson.

If you decide to put in the word "none" for no damages, put that in. And, again, we're talking about over a period of time, so what number of years are you going to make that award for, if at all.

Twenty-three, State the total amount of economic loss, if any, to Gary Motelson and Elissa Motelson resulting from Brian Motelson's death.

And if you decide not to make an award, put in the word "none" or a gross dollar amount.

Okay. Number 24, State the amount of damages awarded to the Estate of Steven Motelson for the conscious pain and suffering, if any,

experienced by Steven Motelson prior to his death.

A dollar amount. If you decide to put in none,

put in the word "none."

State the total amount of economic loss, if any, to each of Enid, Gary -- Enid Motelson, Gary Motelson, Michael Motelson, and Gayle Lydell resulting from Steven Motelson's death, and there we have, if you decide to put in none, you put in the word "none" as to each of them, and they're each individually broken down: Enid Motelson, an amount; Gary Motelson, Michael Motelson, and Gayle Lydell.

Again, we need these check -- on each question you have to do a vote tally; either all six, or five out of six, and the name of the dissenting voter, if there is one.

Twenty-six, last question, State the amount awarded for the following items of damages, if any, incurred by the Estate of Steven Motelson as a result of his death, and that is loss of earnings.

Again, all six of you must agree, or five out of six, what -- what losses were sustained as a result of any loss earnings -- lost earnings.

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1	That is the full questionnaire. Any
2	requests or exceptions to charge?
3	MR. RYAN: May I approach?
4	THE COURT: And as to
5	MR. BELL: I have one suggestion.
6	THE COURT: Why don't we step outside,
7	please.
8	(Whereupon, a discussion was held off
9	the record in chambers.)
10	THE COURT: Be seated. Jurors, I've
11	been instructing you on the manner in which voting
12	takes place, and I said that five out of six would
13	be sufficient.
14	Now, bear in mind that as to each and
15	every question it doesn't if you have five out
16	of six, it doesn't have to be the same five, okay.
17	So, if, you know, five of you agree to
18	one question, and then the next question five of
19	you, but it's a different five, you know, a
20	different dissenter, that's fine. It's any five.
21	So it doesn't have to be consistent throughout.
22	Now, if, in the course of your
23	deliberations, you should come upon something that
24	you don't recollect what took place, or you need a
25	read back of testimony, or a further instruction

based upon what I have given you here, you may, after deliberating with the six of you, you know, if you can't agree as to what a particular fact was that's important to you to answer a question, then you could ask for that read back.

And we're going to give you a paper and pen, and you can write out a question. Please be specific when you write out questions.

You know, saying, Gee, we need all of his testimony, well, guess what? You know, that's going to be a two-hour read or something. You know, we're prepared to do it. We have reporters who have been taking daily copy. We have, you know, a book for each day, a transcript of testimony. We can read back something to you.

If you have a particular issue about a particular thing that was said, and maybe a couple of people address that, please be specific because we have to dig out that information that you're requesting and then agree on the language that is to be read back that answers the question and not more or less than is necessary.

Okay. Lastly, if my instructions are unclear, if you don't understand something on the verdict sheet, then we will -- we will then make

another read to you or a correction for your edification.

Now, in reaching your verdict, you're not to be affected by sympathy for any of the parties, or what the reaction of the parties would be, or the public, to your verdict; whether it will please someone, displease someone, is popular, unpopular or, indeed, any other consideration outside this courtroom.

You should consider both the evidence and the exhibits that have been admitted and the facts that you consider to be believable. Apply the law as I've given it to you, and your verdict will be determined by the conclusions you reach, no matter whom they help nor whom they hurt.

I mentioned that we have lunch ordered for you, and we are going to have you move out at this point to start deliberation.

Now, during the deliberation process, the six of you must be together. What I mean by that, if someone has to use the bathroom break or a smoke break, you have to stop deliberating.

Okay.

You can be looking for something in a pile of paper, but you can't deliberate. You have

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to be the six minds of you together when you deliberate and answer these questions. Okay. So, stay together when you are deliberating.

You could take a break for lunch or you could deliberate during lunch. You're going to be there, but it's those other breaks that we talk about where you must be together.

As to the alternates, we're going to set you up in a different room. You cannot deliberate. In other words, don't evaluate because we may have to throw you into the mix if this thing protracts and somebody gets sick or something.

So, please don't deliberate on these issues. We want -- we have to give you further instruction and start anew if we had to do that. Hopefully not.

You can, you know, take breaks, more extended, obviously, since you don't have to be together to deliberate. So, I hope you brought something good to read.

Jurors, I'm going to turn you loose at this point.

Any requests or exceptions to charge?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

Jury Charge

1	Unity charge 5202
1	THE COURT: Defense?
. 2	MR. CECALA: Not anything that we've
3	already mentioned.
4	THE COURT: Very fine. Jurors, I'm
5	going to take this package from you right now. I
6	have to change that page. We had a typo on one of
7	them. Just give me that. I will make that
8	correction right now.
9	We had the word "or" when it should
10	have been "for" and grammatically it was
11	incorrect. It's a typographical error. We're
12	making that change.
13	We're going to give you an envelope to
14	keep this in. In the event you have to take a
15	a protracted break, do not, obviously, discuss
16	what you're doing in the deliberation process
17	outside the six of you.
18	We'll take the verdict sheet and we
19	would seal it, and no one would be able to look at
20	it if you only have part of it filled out.
21	It's quarter of one. Your lunch
22	should be here shortly, within a half hour or so,
23	and we'll see you later. Okay.
24	THE COURT OFFICER: Okay. Step out,
25	please.