Courts Rule on Important Issues in Drunk Driving Injury Cases: Husband who bought drinks may sue for wife's death; Driver who struck pedestrian may look to bar to share in defense

It’s as simple as A-B-C. The Alcohol Beverage Control Law has long provided that it is a crime to sell alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. Violation of the A.B.C. Law will expose the seller to a lawsuit for civil damages too. We visit two new cases that made their way to appeals courts this month, each starting with a drunk driving car accident and tragic injuries.

Julie Oursler died on 10/27/02 at 3 a.m., after several hours of drinking at a bowling alley in Buffalo, New York. Walking along the side of a road, she was struck by a car and later run over by a police officer responding to a 911 call made by the fellow who hit her.

Four years later, on 10/29/06 at 5 a.m., Kathleen O’Gara was seriously injured when, after drinking heavily at a bar in Katonah, New York and taking narcotic painkillers, she tried to cross the Saw Mill River Parkway and was struck by a car.

These accidents both resulted in personal injury lawsuits that have just now been ruled upon by two separate appeals courts. They involve New York’s Dram Shop Act (General Obligations Law Section 11-101) which provides that anyone who has been injured by a visibly intoxicated person has a claim to recover his damages from the one who caused or contributed to the intoxication by unlawfully selling alcohol.

The typical Dram Shop Act lawsuit involves a slobbering drunk driver who crashes into and injures or kills an innocent victim who (or whose estate) then sues not only the drunk driver but also the bar or restaurant whose bartender could see that his customer was drunk (and should have known his customer would later drive and injure an innocent victim).

This woman should not be served any more drinks:

Neither of the two new cases is typical but each is fascinating and breaks new legal ground.

In Oursler v. Brennan the issue was whether a husband’s actions in buying drinks for his wife would preclude him from winning his own Dram Shop Act case against a bowling alley. Christopher and Julie Oursler were at a Halloween party at the bowling alley where they drank for four hours – Chris bought his wife two beers, she and friends bought others and she also had free Jell-O shots. Dressed in a black witch’s costume, Mrs. Oursler got into a fight outside the bar when she left, was arrested, driven home by the cops and left there with her mother. An hour later, still in black, she left her house, alone, and walked along a dark road. That’s when she was struck by a car and after a 911 call to help her she was run over by the responding officer who did not see her.

How could anyone see a person dressed like this, at night, on a dark road?

Oursler’s estate clearly had no claim in this case because one cannot maintain a lawsuit for personal injuries sustained due to one’s own intoxication. The surviving husband, though, had his own, separate claim for spousal loss of support (the same claim children have upon the death of a parent).

The driver moved to dismiss the husband’s claim under the well settled principle that one who is a guilty participant may not recover for his own injuries caused by an intoxicated person.

The appeals court held that merely buying two beers for his wife did not establish a guilty participation defense. The husband’s claim may now proceed to trial.

Inside Information:

  • Plaintiff still has the difficult burden of proving that there was a practical connection (we lawyers call it "proximate cause") between the unlawful alcohol sale and death several hours later. As a dissenting judge said, this case involves the intervening actions of three sober individuals who directly altered the course of events beyond any reasonable or practical connection to the unlawful alcohol sale to the decedent.
  • Plaintiff will be in the hot seat at trial as the issue of his drinking with his wife will come up again, with full blown testimony from all the witnesses and cross-examination of the husband. A skilled defense lawyer will be permitted to try to convince the jury that the husband participated in getting his wife drunk to such a degree that he should not win money for himself. 

In O’Gara v. Alacci, the issue was whether the driver who struck the drugged and drunk 23 year old plaintiff crossing the highway at night could assert a claim against the bar for contribution to any damages the driver might be liable to pay the plaintiff.

Before wandering onto the highway, Ms. O'Gara took painkillers and drank alcohol. Bad move.

Clearly, plaintiff herself had no claim against the bar for her own injuries; however, in a case of first impression, the appeals court held that the defendant driver could bring in the bar as a so-called third-party defendant and, if found liable, defendant driver could have the bar share in the payment of damages to the plaintiff. The judges stated that their decision promotes an important goal of the Dram Shop Act, namely motivating sellers of alcohol to exercise greater care in their sales.

Inside Information:

  • This was a case that plaintiff would have lost at trial. She was in a stupor, at night, crossing a busy highway and didn’t even know how she came to be there. Nonetheless, defendant settled for $7,500 (nuisance value) while the appeal was pending.
  • Plaintiff sustained fractures to her tibia, thoracic spine and pelvis as well as massive skin injuries requiring grafts.
  • The drinking in this case, as in the Oursler case, took place at a Halloween party.
  • The bar had called a cab for the plaintiff but she left on foot before it arrived.

Unfortunately, drunk drivers often collide with innocent victims with resulting deaths and grievous serious injuries. Lawsuits follow, especially when the drunk driver has insufficient liability insurance coverage and the facts show that the Dram Shop Act was violated (i.e., the drunk was served when he was visibly intoxicated). We will continue to follow these cases and report on interesting decisions and verdicts.

 

Trial Judge Upholds $1,030,000 Pain and Suffering Verdict in New York Injury Case for 11 Year Old Boy's Ankle Fracture

In a case we discussed here, a Kings County trial judge (Hon. James G. Starkey) has now issued a written decision upholding a jury's verdict awarding $1,030,000 for an 11 year old boy's pain and suffering ($190,000 past, $840,000 future) due to an ankle fracture.

Jonathan Bermudez sustained a severe bimalleolar ankle fracture during his sixth grade gym class back in November 2001 when  he was trying to kick a soccer ball during an unsupervised game of line soccer. The case, Bermudez v. New York City Board of Education, went to trial seven years later and after the verdict was rendered, the defendant (the New York City Board of Education) made a motion to set it aside, both as to liability and as to the amount of damages. As to liability, the judge stated in his opinion, here, that there was enough evidence to allow the jury to make a finding that the defendant was negligent in failing to supervise the soccer game. It's likely that an appeals court will have the final word on this issue.

Assuming the appeals court allows the liability verdict to stand, it will also be presented with the damages issue: is $1,030,000 excessive under the circumstances of this case? Judge Starkey said the award was not excessive and that the award should not be set aside.

Here are the factors the judge relied upon:

  • plaintiff's proof included detailed testimony from his treating orthopedic surgeon supported by particularized medical records
  • the defendant did not call an expert of its own
  • plaintiff's life expectancy is 56 years and he may require surgical fusion of his ankle due to arthritis
  • plaintiff's had four separate surgical procedures before trial (including an osteotomy)

Here is what an osteotomy looks like:

As this case makes its way up to the appellate court (the Appellate Division, 2nd Department), the parties need to be mindful of the recent decision by that court in Smith v. Bywise Holding LLC in which a 44 year old man fell and sustained a fracture of the distal region of his tibia (which forms the upper portion of his ankle). Robert Smith underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery and his pain and suffering Kings County jury verdict of $775,000 ($175,000 past, $600,000 future - 25 years) was reduced by the trial judge and ultimately set by the appeals court at $500,000 ($175,000 past, $325,000 future).

The ankle injuries, treatment and prognoses in Smith and Bermudez, are quite similar so there is a good chance that the appeals court would affirm the damages verdicts in Bermudez. While we note that Jonathan Bermudez was awarded much more than Smith for future damages ($840,000 compared to $325,000), Jonathan's life expectancy (and therefore the amount of time he is expected to suffer from his injuries) is a little more than twice that of Mr. Smith's so the future damages award to Jonathan appears to be in a permissible range.

We will follow this case and report back as it makes its way through the appeals process.

 

 

Leg Fracture Verdicts for Pain and Suffering in New York Injury Cases Upheld on Appeal for $1,100,000 and $1,500,000

A broken or fractured tibia (the shin bone) is the most common long-bone injury. Several types of fractures can occur, ranging from the hairline stress fractures common in runners to severe open fractures (where the skin is broken) often resulting from motor vehicle accidents. And when severe, the fibula (the long, thin lateral or outside bone of the lower leg) is also fractured - thus the term tib-fib fractures.

An appellate court in New York has just upheld a $1,100,000 jury verdict for a 45 year old woman's pain and suffering ($500,000 past, $600,000 future) for fractures of her tibia and fibula. In Keating v. SS&R Management Co., Lori Keating was a passenger in a taxi that was struck by another car. She sustained an open fracture of her tibia and a fracture of her fibula, requiring six surgical procedures performed over the course of three years, including external fixation and internal fixation, as well as skin, muscle and nerve grafts. The Manhattan jury was also told of the fact that Ms. Keating's fractures did not heal (non-union), causing her significant pain and leaving her with severe scarring. The jury awarded her a whopping $12,000,000 for her pain and suffering ($5,000,000 past, $7,000,000 future) but those amounts were reduced by the trial judge to the amounts then sustained this month by the appellate court.

Here's an intraoperative (during surgery) illustration of the type of open reduction internal fixation ("ORIF") surgery that Ms. Keating underwent showing how the rod is placed down into the tibia:

 

In another recent appellate case, Bello v. New York City Transit Authority, a jury's $1,500,000 verdict for pain and suffering ($750,000 past, $750,000 future) was upheld for Vidal Bello, a boy who was seven years old when he was struck by a moving bus that then rolled over his leg resulting in open tib-fib fractures as well as a degloving injury to that leg (i.e, the skin was torn away, or avulsed). By the time of trial, Vidal had already suffered through eight surgical procedures including external fixation, grafting and placement of an intramedullary rod.

Here's what his leg looked like with the intramedullary rod in place:

 

Vidal also had ugly scarring from the accident, a permanently curved leg and a limp that would only get worse over the course of his entire life.

The Keating and Bello cases are important in evaluating the upper limits of lower leg pain and suffering verdicts and settlements; however, it's also important to appreciate that juries can award much lower amounts that will be sustained and that the appellate courts are not forced to modify up or down jury verdicts that to the litigants seem too low or too high. The standard, as we have previously discussed here and here, is simply this as set forth in CPLR 5501:

  • The jury's pain and suffering award will be deemed excessive or inadequate "if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation."

CPLR 5501 is not much of a guide for injured persons or their attorneys. Add to that the fact that appellate court decisions routinely fail to advise the readers of the precise injuries or the disabilities suffered. Worse yet: the appellate court cases often cite as support (for their rulings increasing or decreasing a jury award) cases that do not even deal with or discuss the injuries in the pending case.

As readers of this blog know, it is our aim to fill these voids as much as possible by digging into these cases, to find out -- from appellate briefs, trial transcripts, trial court motions and the like -- exactly what it was that happened to the injured plaintiff. In that way, all concerned with injury case pain and suffering evaluation can have more and relevant information with which to make educated settlement and trial decisions.

We leave you with an example of a recent appellate court case dealing with the reduction of a jury's award for pain and suffering in a a case involving comminuted fractures to the shaft of a 53 year old man's tibia and fibula. In Brown v. Elliston, a pedestrian was injured in 2003 when a car hit him and came to a stop on top of his leg and then rolled back over it a second time. In 2006, a Suffolk County jury awarded Mr. Brown $800,000 for his pain and suffering ($300,000 past, $500,000 future) after hearing evidence that Brown's leg was in a hard cast for nine months, he developed an ulcer at the fracture site, he had open reduction internal fixation surgery and was left with an angled foot and a limp. All of that was gleaned from the appellate court decision which then goes on to reduce the future pain and suffering jury award from $500,000 to $400,000 while affirming the $300,000 past pain and suffering award - total appellate determination: $700,000.

Here's what is disturbing about the decision in Brown:

  • There is no mention of Mr. Brown's prior accident, in 1995, when he was crushed between two garbage trucks and left totally disabled, unable to walk well and on narcotic pain medication. The defense briefs on appeal which we dug up made much of these facts. The appeals court makes no mention of them. That's simply  not instructive, if not downright unfair, to future litigants and their attorneys who constantly need to evaluate injury cases and seek to do so in large part with guidance from appellate court precedent. After all, when both sides are fully informed as to injury case evaluation, then there will be more settlements and fewer trials. Aren't those admirable goals and aren't they to be facilitated by lofty appeals courts?
  • There is no explanation at all for why the appeals court chose to reduce the future pain and suffering award from $500,000 to $400,000. That's not such a large percentage and one wonders: why not reduce by $50,000? why not by $250,000? For most people, $50,000 here and $250,000 there are significant amounts and if we are to have appeals court judges who were not present at the trials reduce or increase the jury's verdicts by these or any similar amounts then are we not entitled to some explanation?
  • The cases cited are not instructive. For example, the first and the most recent case cited is Singh v.Catamount Development Corp. That's a case involving a 14 year old boy in a skiing accident who sustained both a fractured femur and a fractured shoulder. No tibia or fibula fractures. And there, the plaintiff returned to competitive skiing 10 months after his accident. So why refer at all to that case as precedent in which there was an upward modification to $300,000 (the jury had awarded $18,000 for past pain and suffering and nothing for future)? What's the relevance? What lesson is the court trying to impart? Beats me - it's totally unclear.

We will continue our effort to shine light on and analyze significant pain and suffering verdicts and settlements so that persons with traumatic injuries and their attorneys can evaluate their own cases with more knowledge and information than is available from the publicly reported court decisions.

 

 

 

$575,000 for Ankle Injuries

In Pryce v. County of Suffolk, New York's appellate court which handles appeals from Long Island as well as Westchester and nearby counties, the Appellate Division Second Department, upheld a jury's $575,000 pain and suffering award for a 63 year old maintenance man who fractured his ankle after stepping off a county bus and being struck by another vehicle.

The plaintiff suffered open comminuted fractures of the distal portions of his left leg's tibia, extending into the lateral portion of the ankle joint.

He had to undergo open reduction internal fixation surgery (surgical repair of fractured bones using hardware such as plates, screws and rods)  and the application of an external fixation device. Also, he had to have the fixation device removed surgically and he underwent four weeks of inpatient rehabilitation.

At 63 years of age, the life expectancy tables indicate the plaintiff had about 18 years more to live and part of the jury's award, $275,000, was meant to compensate him for his future pain and suffering from this injury in which he claimed he'd have to walk forever with a limp (the defense claimed he'd made a good recovery).

In another recent case, Bermudez  v. New York City Board of Education (Supreme Court, Kings County, Index # 27303/02) [no court decision and not reported publicly but summary available for purchase at Verdict Search], an 11 year old schoolboy fractured his ankle in gym class in a game of soccer. He sued claiming negligent supervision by  his teachers. The jury awarded him $1,030,000 for his pain and suffering - $190,000 for past pain and suffering plus $840,000 for the future.

The boy's ankle fracture was first treated by open reduction and internal fixation and then two years later he underwent an osteotomy (surgical cut through a bone with pieces then removed or repositioned).

At trial, Bermudez's lawyer argued that he would develop residual arthritis and need in the future a surgical fusion of his ankle (in which joint cartilage is removed and screws, plates, rods or pins are placed to hold the position to allow the bones to fuse solid over a few months time).

There are important distinctions between these two recent ankle fracture cases.

  • The disparity in age between the two plaintiffs: in Pryce, a 63 year old and in Bermudez, an 11 year old. Clearly the jury concluded that the 11 year old plaintiff would suffer for many years more than the 63 year old Pryce and awarded him $840,000 for his future damages as opposed to only $275,00 for Pryce's future damages.
  • The Pryce case is an appellate court case and therefore provides much more guidance and is of significant value in guiding lawyers and insurance companies in evaluating pain and suffering in ankle fracture cases.
  • In Bermudez,  not only could there be an appellate reversal on the liability grounds (i.e., whether the city was negligent as a matter of law for either failing to instruct the class or failing to supervise them) but also it appears that the damages award is subject to attack. First, the plaintiff's settlement demand before trial was only $450,000 (the city had offered only $60,000). Second, any appeal in this case would go to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which ruled in Pryce and which is generally more conservative in its evaluations than its co-equal branch the First Department (which hears appeals from Manhattan and the Bronx only).

We will follow and report any changes.