Wrongful Death Damages in the Sum of $520,000 and Bus Driver's Negligence Affirmed but New Trial Ordered to Determine whether Verdict should be Reduced for Comparative Fault of 15 year old Decedent Riding his Bicycle too closely to Bus

It was a beautiful summer day on July 20, 2001, still light out around 7 p.m., when 15 year old Geremy McConnell was riding his bicycle on Hyland Boulevard, just north of Donley Avenue, in Staten Island. He was headed towards his cousin’s house but was killed instantly when the right rear wheel of a 40 foot long New York City Transit Authority bus ran over his head.

Tragedy ensued when there was a collision between a bicyclist and a bus:

In the ensuing wrongful death lawsuit, Geremy’s widowed 48 year old mother, Geraldine McConnell, claimed, through the testimony of an expert accident reconstructionist, that the bus driver should and could have seen Geremy if he had looked in his right side mirror. The expert also concluded that the bus driver failed to leave enough space between his bus and a car in the parking lane that he was trying to maneuver around when the collision occurred.

Bicyclists often ride to the right of big buses, like this:

The evidence established that Geremy was riding his bike five inches from the right side of the moving bus attempting to ride between the bus and a parked car. Therefore, the defense contended, Geremy lost control of his bike in his own attempt to maneuver around the parked car and that he alone was responsible for the tragic accident.

After nine days of trial, on January 22, 2008, a Richmond County jury determined that the bus driver was 100% at fault for the accident. The jurors also determined that Geremy was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. They then awarded Geremy’s mother $520,000 for her economic loss resulting from his death.

Last week, in McConnell v. Santana (2nd Dept. 2010), the appellate court ruled that it was logically impossible for the jury to find that Geremy was negligent without also finding that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Therefore, the judges ruled that there must be a new trial solely on the issue of whether Geremy was at fault in the happening of the accident and whether such fault was a proximate cause of the accident.

There are many situations in which a finding that a plaintiff was negligent will not require the additional finding that his fault was a significant factor in causing an accident (for example, when a plaintiff driver is found negligent for failing to see a defendant driver but plaintiff’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the accident because of defendant’s excessive speed). In this case, though, the appellate judges found otherwise because the issues of negligence and proximate cause were so inextricably interwoven.

The new jury will not address the issues of whether the bus driver was negligent or the damage award was a proper amount. Those findings stand; however, if the new jury finds that Geremy’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident, then they will be required to apportion the fault between the bus driver and Geremy, thus reducing the award to Geremy’s mother.

The damages award was based solely on the economic loss sustained by Mrs. McConnell. Under New York’s wrongful death laws (unlike many other states), there are no provisions for the recovery of money damages for loss of love or affection.

Under EPTL 5-4.3, damages in wrongful death cases are limited to “pecuniary” losses – essentially, the economic losses, such as loss of economic support, inheritance and/or household services, sustained by a decedent’s family members.

Plaintiff’s expert economist testified that as a high school graduate Geremy would have earned a total gross income of $1,850,000 by the time he was 49 years old when his mother would have reached her life expectancy of 82 years. And Mrs. McConnell testified that Geremy had helped around the house with chores and contributed financially to her ($15 to $30 per paycheck) from his part-time jobs at a church and a museum. She needed his support as she'd lost both her husband and her job at White Castle making $6.50 an hour.

Geremy was clearly a loving and devoted son who helped his mother with chores and whatever money he could.

The defense argued on appeal that $520,000 was unreasonably excessive because:

  1. there was insufficient evidence that the 48 year old Mrs. McConnell would, absent the accident, have inherited anything from Geremy
  2. the economist projected only $26,000 for the loss of Geremy's household services, and
  3. while it was reasonable to expect Geremy would have contributed some money to his mother over her lifetime, there was no basis to assume he’d have given her $520,000 over the next 34 years as that represented an excessively unrealistic portion, 28%, of his projected gross earnings.

The appellate court implicitly rejected the defense arguments in ruling, without explanation, that the $520,000 jury award did not deviate from what would be reasonable compensation and therefore that finding will apply to the retrial.

Inside Information:

  • The parties stipulated that the right rear wheel of the bus went over Geremy’s head, resulting in his death. The jury made no award for pre-death pain and suffering and no award for pre-impact terror, findings that clearly had no evidentiary basis and which were not appealed by the plaintiff.
  • A passenger in the bus testified for the defense that just before hearing a thud he’d seen a bicyclist moving “very fast” and at “a crazy angle toward the bus.” On cross-examination, though, the witness admitted that at the time and for years he’d been on a powerful prescription medication (Haldol) to control “hearing voices” and that the drug caused memory loss. He also admitted he suffered from extropia and had limited vision.

 

 

Death Case Verdict: $5,000,000 for 4 1/2 Years of Pain and Suffering (While in a Coma) - Will Not Stand on Appeal

A Westchester County jury recently returned a verdict of $5,000,000 in favor of the estate of a woman who died because of medical malpractice. It will not stand up on appeal.

In Schaffer v. Stony Lodge Hospital (Supreme Court, Westchester County; Index # 4155/99; 11/6/08), a 68 year old woman with long standing depression went to a small psychiatric  hospital (Stony Lodge) for a change of her anti-depressant medication. While there, she suffered a seizure and so was transferred to a community hospital (Phelps Memorial Hospital). There,  she had another seizure, a heart attack and then became comatose and never regained consciousness. She died 4 1/2 years later.

Liability for the medical malpractice in failing to timely treat the hyponatremia was clear enough so Phelps Hospital and one of its doctors settled early on for $1,750,000. The main doctor who committed the malpractice, though, Narain Batheja, refused to settle and the case came to trial and the jury found that  Mrs. Schaffer's suffering, albeit while comatose, had a value of $5,000,000.

No doubt this case will be appealed and there are several issues:

  • Was there enough evidence that Mrs. Schaffer actually experienced conscious pain and suffering while comatose? Plaintiff points to statements from family members and nurses that Mrs. Schaffer followed her caregivers with her eyes and cried at times. The defense will no doubt point out that there was no medical examination pre-death as to level of consciousness.
  • The other issue that will be heavily contested on appeal is the reasonableness of $5,000,000 as pain and suffering damages for 4 1/2 years while comatose

Here are some cases that indicate that the $5,000,000 may not withstand an appeal:

  • Jump v. Facelle (2d Dept., 2002) - In this case the court held that $1,300,000 was reasonable for eight months of pre-death pain and suffering, including persistent abdominal infection, several surgeries, and a permanent colostomy and bed sore.
  • Ramos v. Shah (2d Dept., 2002) - The court ruled that $900,000 pre-death pain and suffering was too high and that $450,000 was proper and reasonable in a case in which a decedent died due to medical malpractice resulting in a cardiac arrest and his lapse into a coma for several days before death. There was some testimony that the decedent had some level of consciousness for several days.
  • Weldon v. Beal (2d Dept., 2000) - In this medical malpractice case, the Kings county jury awarded a brain damaged plaintiff $13,500,000 for pain and suffering ($3,000,000 past; $10,500,000 future) despite the fact that she was in a vegetative state. There was evidence that she had some level of awareness (and that she'd need almost $2,000,000 of medical expenses for the rest of her life). The appellate court held that the pain and suffering verdict was too high and reduced it to $5,000,000 ($2,000,000 past; $3,000,000 future).

Insider Information:

  • Plaintiff's attorney in Schaffer v. Stony Lodge Hospital would have accepted a total of $3,000,000 to settle all claims - meaning that defendant Batheja could have settled for $1,250,000 (and I hear that plaintiff's counsel at trial would have reduced that figure to $750,000).
  • In this case, the non-settling doctor's insurance carrier, Frontier Insurance Company, was stubborn and would not concede liability in a case in which those involved on all sides now tell me was indefensible.
  • The plaintiff's husband was also awarded $3,000,000 in addition for loss of consortium. That's the claim of the non-injured spouse for loss of services and it usually involves the disruption to the marriage, the many hours spent caring for the injured person, the lack of intimacy and the like. It's usually around 10% of the injured spouse's pain and suffering verdict and the appellate courts can and will determine that loss of services verdicts should be reduced in appropriate cases. This will be one of those cases if not settled before an appeal is concluded. In my experience, this loss of services claim will end up nowhere near $3,000,000.

UPDATE: As we predicted, on September 14, 2010, in Schaffer v. Batheja (2d Dept. 2010), the appellate court drastically reduced the pre-death pain and suffering award to $2,500,000. Additionally, the court reduced Mr. Schaffer's jury award to $500,000. The decision is discussed by us here.

 

 

 

$2,450,000 for Wrongful Death of 6 Year Old Boy

A six year old California boy died during a family trip when the rear tire on the rental car his father was driving blew out and the car rolled over.

  According to the family attorney, William Berman of San Diego, after years in court, forensic experts and deposition testimony revealed that the rental car firm allowed the failed tire to run for a prolonged time in a severely under-inflated state. The defendant finally admitted liability and a $2,450,000 wrongful death settlement was reached.

 

 

Had this case been brought in New York or governed by New York's wrongful death laws, the result would have been drastically different.

Under New York's wrongful death statute - EPTL Section 5-4.3 - there are two categories of damages in death cases:

  1. special damages - such as funeral, medical and nursing expenses
  2. general damages - the pecuniary (i.e., monetary) loss to the decedent's survivors

There are no damages allowed in New York wrongful death cases for the parents' grief or emotional loss (unless the parents were at the scene and either physically injured in the same accident or within the zone of danger).

Here is what the judges read to the juries, right from New York's Pattern Jury Instructions, before submitting these types of claims for their consideration:

 

  • You may not consider or make any award for sorrow, mental anguish, injury to feelings or loss of companionship.
  • You must determine the economic value of the decedent to his distributees (his heirs)

 

This is in distinction to most other states, such as California, and something the plaintiff's bar in New York has for many years, unsuccessfully, tried to have changed legislatively.

 

The only other significant category of recovery in wrongful death cases involving minors in New York is pre-death conscious pain and suffering. That's often not relevant (e.g., instant death from an accident, death from medical malpractice while under anesthesia). We've discussed in a recent post important  cases dealing with the pre-death pain and suffering aspect in wrongful death cases.

So the main claim the families of minors in New York are often left with is that the decedent would have contributed his or her net income to, or otherwise would have financially helped, the survivors.

How do you prove that a two year old would have become a significant income earner and would have given over to his parents significant amounts during their lifetime? Plaintiffs' attorneys are relegated to issues such as the infant's intelligence, likely education, statements that were made regarding future support, the parents' own economic situation, how much the kid helped around the house and the like. Very difficult and sometimes impossible to prove.

Here are some cases in which there were verdicts awarding damages for the loss of an infant's future financial support:

  • Cepeda v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp (1st Dept. 2003) -  $83,000 jury award for future pecuniary loss for the death of a 12 day old infant went unchallenged on appeal
  • Kruger v. Wilde (4th Dept. 1994) - $100,000 for pecuniary loss for the death of a 14 year old girl who was a good student and worked part-time
  • Alcalay v. Town of North Hempstead [unreported case] - $200,000 for pecuniary loss for death of 12 year old

Insider's tip: Even in the absence of any verifiable proof, attorneys in New York representing the heirs of a deceased infant will usually make a wrongful death claim. At a minimum, they have the parents testify as to the help they expected the deceased infant to contribute to the family (i.e., household chores) and, if there was a part-time job or any scintilla of evidence (school report cards, the child's stated aspirations), then proof is adduced as to career goals too. If the jury has any basis at all to award pecuniary damages then its award may stand or at worst be reduced somewhat on appeal.

To end on a positive note of sorts, I leave you with references to some recent lawsuit victories in wrongful death cases of minors brought in states other than New York:

We will follow the cases and trends in this emerging area of wrongful death litigation and encourage readers from all areas to report new developments as they break.