Girl with Fractured Femur from Construction Site Accident Wins New Damages Trial due to Jury's Inconsistent Pain and Suffering Awards ($100,000 for Future, Zero for Past)

On September 1, 2000 Jennifer Arietta was struck by an eight foot piece of plywood accidentally dropped from the third floor window at 513 Beekman Avenue in the Bronx. The plank was being used as a window cover by contractors renovating the building and ten year old Jennifer just happened to be walking on the sidewalk below with her brother.

Plywood windows, like this, are common at construction sites but they are not supposed to fall three stories to the ground:

Rushed to the local hospital, Jennifer was diagnosed with a displaced fracture of her right leg’s distal femur and she was placed in a full leg cast from her upper thigh down to her foot. After three months, the cast was removed and Jennifer underwent five months of physical therapy.

The fracture was classified as Salter II, meaning that it was through the growth plate and epiphysis (the site where most of the longitudinal growth of bones occurs):

In her ensuing lawsuit, Jennifer won full liability against the construction site owner and two contractors and then, on May 18, 2007, a Bronx County jury determined that her pain and suffering damages should be $100,000 (zero for the past – 6 ½ years, $100,000 future – one year).

In their appeal of the verdict, Jennifer's attorneys argued that the damages award was insufficient and inconsistent. The appellate court in Arietta v. Shams Waterproofing, Inc. has issued its decision ordering a new trial on damages because there was “no rational explanation” for the failure to award any damages at all for past pain and suffering.

At the time of trial, six and a half years after the accident, Jennifer stated that she had substantial pain in her right leg in addition to back and hip pain.

The defense doctor testified that Jennifer’s fracture healed well, any pain she was experiencing was from other conditions and she would need no surgery in the future related to this accident.

Jennifer’s doctor, though, testified that the fracture led to a premature closing of the growth plate and that as a result she suffers a four centimeter shortening of her leg and will need extensive surgery to lengthen her leg impairing her ability to walk.

There are multiple methods for leg lengthening surgery but many involve application of an external fixation device, like the one shown here applied to the lower leg:

The appellate court’s reversal was narrowly limited and focused only on the improper failure to award any damages for past pain and suffering. The court did not address the issues of whether there was a basis for the jury’s finding that Jennifer’s future pain and suffering should be limited to only one year and whether $100,000 is an unreasonably low amount for Jenifer’s future pain and suffering.

Inside Information:

  • Jennifer was born with cerebral palsy which required surgery on her left leg before this accident.
  • One year after this accident, Jennifer underwent a right leg derotational osteotomy to correct some long-standing problems related to her spine and abnormal tilting of her pelvis.
  • Jennifer’s 12 year old brother, Oscar, was also injured in the accident sustaining a torn ligament in his elbow requiring a brace for eight months and arthroscopic surgery in the future. Oscar was awarded $13,600 for his pain and suffering (zero for the past; $13,600 future – one year). The appellate court reversed this verdict as well.
     

$8,000,000 Brain Damage Verdict Vacated by Appeals Court; New Trial Ordered Because Trial Judge Erroneously Discharged a Deliberating Juror

Destiny Avila was born at Harlem Hospital on January 5, 2001. It was a difficult delivery - Destiny was 10 pounds and her clavicle had to be forcibly fractured to get her out. Then, she was intubated and sent to the neonatal ICU for two days. Apparently all was well and baby and mother were discharged on January 9, 2001 (four days after birth).

Here is where Destiny Avila's saga began:

By the time she was three years old, Destiny's mother noticed she had developmental delays. An evaluation indicated that she had a developmental age of only 10 months. Her mother promptly started a lawsuit in 2004 against the hospital and its doctors claiming medical errors during delivery had caused brain damage to her baby.

After a three week trial in Manhattan Supreme Court, on October 18, 2007 the jury rendered an $8,000,000 verdict in plaintiff’s favor.

In Avila v. City of New York, an appeals court has now set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial because the trial judge erroneously dismissed a juror and seated an alternate after deliberations had begun.

Plaintiff’s medical experts had testified that the doctors should have performed a caesarean section because of the baby’s large size and indications that she was not receiving enough oxygen. They felt that Destiny had sustained hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (permanent brain injury due to a lack of oxygen or adequate blood flow to the brain) and they concluded she has mild cerebral palsy as a result.

The defendants’ medical experts could not have disagreed more. The said a vaginal delivery was appropriate and that Destiny suffered no significant injuries other than the clavicle fracture and that injury was no one’s fault. Most importantly, they were adamant that Destiny was not suffering from cerebral palsy. Instead, they strongly urged that any medical or developmental problems plaintiff may have had were minimal and/or within the spectrum of a previously diagnosed autism disorder.

The defense urged that the only injury Destiny sustained at birth was a fractured clavicle:

In awarding plaintiff $8,000,000 ($500,000 past – 6 ½ years, $7,500,000 future – 74 years), the jury clearly rejected the defense claims that there was no medical negligence and that the injuries were minimal. While the defense argued that there was no negligence, they did concede that Destiny was 50% globally delayed with speech and language deficits.

On appeal, the defense claimed that:

  1. plaintiff should not have been allowed to present expert testimony that she had cerebral palsy since this was a brand new never before disclosed theory,
  2. the trial judge committed an error requiring reversal when, without meaningful inquiry, she seated an alternate juror without defense counsel’s consent after discharging a deliberating juror who claimed there was intimidation inside the jury room, and
  3. if the verdict on liability should be upheld the amount of damages was grossly excessive and should be reduced

The appeals judges agreed with the defense that the verdict must be reversed because of the juror dismissal and seating of an alternate without consent and they vacated the verdict (thus rendering the other two issues moot).

Here are the details as to the drama inside the jury room. After deliberations began, the lone female juror, “Juror Number 3,” ran out of the jury room and said:

“I’m not going in there again. I am not going to – I’m starting to physically fight and I’m not going to be in the room.”

Things were pretty crazy inside the jury room:

After speaking with the entire panel, the judge sent them back to deliberate further. The day ended with the jury having reached a partial (undisclosed) verdict. The next morning, Juror Number 3 delivered a note to the judge complaining that another juror had been intimidating and threatening and that he physically threatened another juror and yet other jurors had to intervene. Juror Number 3 wrote that she was not comfortable she could make a rational decision in the case.

The judge then dismissed Juror Number 3, seated an alternate juror and a full verdict was reached after four more hours of deliberation.

Alternate jurors are chosen during jury selection so that if, before jury deliberations begin, a regular juror dies or becomes ill or for any other reason is unable to perform his duty, an alternate will be available and seated. There is no provision in the statute, CPLR 4106, that contemplates seating an alternate after jury deliberations begin. That's because citizens in civil actions have a constitutionally protected right to a jury of six. Only if the attorneys all consent may an alternate be allowed to deliberate after deliberations begin.

Defendants in this case, though, did not consent. Had the judge conducted an inquiry into Juror Number 3’s concerns before discharging her then defense counsel may have consented but the judge’s dismissal of Juror Number 3 without meaningful inquiry was held to be improper and therefore seating of the alternate was also improper.

The question of whether $8,000,000 in damages was excessive was briefed fully by the parties on appeal but not resolved because it became moot. Should plaintiff again prevail on liability, it’s unlikely that such a sum would be sustained.

Here are some of the recent appellate decisions that sustained pain and suffering awards for brain damage in the multi-million dollar range (and plaintiff’s injuries in Avila v. City of New York do not appear to be nearly as severe as those in any of these cases):

  • Lopez v. NYCHHC (1st Dept. 2000)- $3,100,000 for 30 years of future pain and suffering where infant suffered cerebral palsy, spastic quadriplegia and inability to speak, sit or walk
  • Reed v. City of New York (1st Dept. 2003) - $2,500,000 for 30 years of future pain and suffering for multiple skull fractures and very substantial brain damage leading to memory loss, a permanent inability to lie down, total loss of smell, severe orthopedic disabilities and pain, depression and suicidal ideation 
  • Paek v. City of New York (1st Dept. 2006) - $3,000,000 for 40 years of future pain and suffering for a 35 year old woman with permanent significant cognitive deficits affecting her memory, attention span and concentration as well as severe depression and constant pain from persistent headaches

Inside Information:

  • Plaintiff did not seek an award of future damages for medical care. While not dispositive of whether there will be future pain and suffering, where there are no likely future medical costs the claim for future pain and suffering is often discounted by jurors. Not so in this case so far but with another jury that could be a problem for the plaintiff’s future pain and suffering claim.
  • Plaintiff, age 6 at trial, had no physical disabilities, a normal gait and was described by her mother as a happy child who likes to dance and play.
  • Plaintiff claimed that Destiny will never have functional communication, be able to live independently or hold a job.
  • With a new trial, Destiny will have aged a few more years and the new jury will be better able to estimate her future damages, should plaintiff again prevail on liability.
     

Medical Malpractice in Childbirth Results in Large Pain and Suffering Verdicts Approved by Appellate Court - $5,000,000 for Mother and $4,150,000 for Infant

On October 15, 1998, Eung Maing, then 37 years old and 41 weeks pregnant with her first child, was admitted to St. Vincent’s Hospital in Queens, New York. The doctors determined that she had insufficient amniotic fluid and labor should be induced.


After a difficult 24 hours or so, a low forceps delivery was performed and baby Daniel was born.


His Apgar score was one out of 10 because of a faint heartbeat so Daniel was intubated and taken to the intensive care unit where he remained for six days. Upon discharge, he appeared to be in good shape. Two years later, though, Daniel’s parents noticed that he had an abnormal gait and he was diagnosed with mild cerebral palsy.


Mrs. Maing had her own medical problems. During the course of delivery she sustained a fourth degree laceration of her vagina that extended to her rectum. It was repaired in the hospital but she later developed a rectovaginal fistula and other extensive and long lasting gastrointestinal problems.


In an ensuing lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors, plaintiffs claimed that:

  1. the doctors were negligent in their repair of Mrs. Maing's vaginal laceration and
  2. Daniel should have been delivered via Cesarean section, like this:

As a result of the malpractice, plaintiffs claimed and in 2008 the jury agreed:

  1. Daniel had sustained brain damage in his forceps delivery that left him with left side hemiparesis causing his walking problems as well as attention deficit disorder, and
  2. Mrs. Maing had sustained permanent incontinence resulting in nine surgeries, including a diverting colostomy and the ultimate need of a permanent colostomy.


Daniel was awarded $7,150,000 for his pain and suffering ($150,000 past – 10 years, $7,000,000 future – 65 years) and Mrs. Maing was awarded $11,000,000 ($4,500,000 past, $6,500,000 future – 34 years).

On a post-trial motion, the trial judge issued a decision reducing the awards in Maing v. Fong as follows: to $2,650,000 for Daniel ($150,000 past, $2,500,000 future) and to $5,000,000 for Mrs. Maing ($2,000,000 past, $3,000,000 future).


In an appellate court decision released on March 30, 2010 in Maing v. Fong (2nd Dept. 2010), Mrs. Maing’s $5,000,000 pain and suffering award was affirmed while Daniel’s $2,650,000 award was deemed inadequate and increased to $4,150,000 ($150,000 past, $4,000,000 future).


Once again, New York judges have rendered decisions involving very serious injuries in which, without any adequate explanation, they ordered millions of dollars of modifications to jury verdicts for pain and suffering. The trial judge’s decision fails to state the reasons for reducing Mrs. Maing’s $11,000,000 jury award for her pain and suffering to $5,000,000; nor does the appellate court decision that affirmed that $6,000,000 reduction. And neither decision set forth any reason for disturbing Daniel’s future pain and suffering award (the trial judge reduced it from $7,000,000 to $2,500,000 while the appellate judges then increased it to $4,000,000).


Our research team at New York Injury Cases Blog has dug up the facts that the judges refused to divulge ( the foregoing details as to the injuries were not disclosed in either opinion) and we have uncovered the legal arguments made by the parties and the case precedents that applied.


The defense argued that Daniel’s future pain and suffering award was excessive, his injuries were more akin to an orthopedic problem than to brain damage and any characterization of Daniel’s case to the plethora of “brain damaged infant” cases (that often result in multimillion dollar verdicts) would be woefully misplaced. While Daniel was in poor condition at birth, he responded well to treatment and was discharged from the hospital after one week.

Daniel appeared to be developing normally until he was 2 ½ years old when a left foot inversion and weak left lower extremity dorsiflexion were noted. He underwent physical therapy, wore a foot brace and by the age of five he was rollerblading.

At trial, there was evidence that Daniel was an outstanding student with an IQ in the 97th percentile and he could run and had a normal gait except for inversion of his toes that was diagnosed as tibial torsion - a usually temporary early childhood condition in which the tibia is twisted inwards and looks like this:


Daniel’s lawyers argued that he has mild cerebral palsy but with profound consequences that will get worse as he gets older. They exhibited Daniel’s walk to the jury and, while not dramatic, they argued that it is awkward, he has a slight limp and he can’t play sports. His parents said he avoids using his left hand.


As to Daniel’s mental condition, a neuropsychologist testified that he has major attention and behavioral problems, is hyperactive and very impaired in his ability to handle daily living tasks. The expert acknowledged that Daniel is smart but concluded that he has moderate to severe attention deficit disorder which is permanent and will get worse.


The law (CPLR 5522) requires appellate courts to identify the reasons for their decisions in cases where they modify a pain and suffering damages verdict under their powers in CPLR 5501. They should look to comparable prior cases when adding to or reducing from a jury verdict. If any of them did so in Maing v. Fong, we have no indication.


Here are some recent cases in which significant awards were sustained on appeal for injuries similar to Daniel’s that the judges in his case failed to cite or discuss in their opinions:

 

  • Lovett v. Interfaith Medical Center (2nd Dept. 2008) - $4,575,000 for a six year old who suffered brain damage at birth causing cerebral palsy, spastic diplegia, mental retardation, sleep apnea and motor skill deficits. He cannot communicate and is wheelchair bound.
  • Flaherty v. Fromberg (2nd Dept. 2007) – $4,250,000 for a seven year old who suffered brain damage at birth causing cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegia. He is fed by a tube and is totally dependent on his family and caretakers.


As to Mrs. Faing, the defense had little to rebut the gruesome nature of her injuries and treatment. It had been 10 years during she’d been undergoing surgery after surgery (nine in all) to try to remedy her incontinence (the details of which are very unsettling) and there was credible testimony that she’s going to need a permanent colostomy. The issue, therefore, was not so much the severity of Mrs. Faing’s pain and suffering but what figure represents reasonable compensation. Was it $11,000,000 as the jury said? Or $5,000,000 as the judges said? Or something more or less?


Here are some recent cases in which significant awards were sustained on appeal for injuries similar to Mrs. Faing’s that the judges in her case failed to cite or discuss in their opinions:

  • Salmeri v. Beth Israel Medical Center (2nd Dept. 2007) – $1,820,000 for a 49 year old man who underwent four surgeries due to malpractice in treating his acute perforated diverticulum, suffered daily stomach pain, had to wear an abdominal binder and suffered from a fistula in his stomach.
  • Herrera v. St. Martin (2nd Dept. 2006) – $3,000,000 for a 55 year old woman with total paralysis of her lower extremities and incontinence.
  • Beverly H. v. Jewish Hosp. and Med. Center of Brooklyn (2nd Dept. 1987) - $700,000 for a woman who underwent an episiotomy during delivery of her child and over the next 18 months required four surgeries including a colostomy.


Inside Information:

  • Mr. Faing presented a claim for loss of consortium. The jury rejected it and awarded him nothing at all. The trial judge found that $1,000,000 should have been awarded to Mr. Faing and the appellate court agreed.
  • In Capone v. Ciancolo (Supreme Court, Kings County, Index # 37310/06; 2/27/10), a $5,000,000 jury verdict was rendered for pain and suffering in favor of a 48 year old man in a car accident who sustained a laceration of his colon requiring a colostomy (removed after eight weeks) and a hernia that required surgery. No doubt, the parties in that case will now look to the decision in Maing v. Fong in arguing for a reduction or affirmance of the verdict amounts.