Appellate Court Reverses Jury's $465,000 Pain and Suffering Veridct and Dismisses Complaint - No Evidence of Recent Medical Examination in Neck, Back and Shoulder Injury Car Accident Case

The defendants admitted that they caused the car accident on August 9, 2005 when Fred Nesci's car was totaled after it was rear ended by their SUV.

Rear end collision damage:

Fred and his passenger (his wife Valerie) claimed serious injuries but the defense insisted on a damages trial arguing that the injuries were not enough to meet the serious injury threshold required for car accident plaintiffs before they may recover any pain and suffering damages, as set forth in New York's restrictive Insurance Law Section 5102 (d).

A January 2009 trial in Nassau County resulted in a jury verdict for the two plaintiffs in the sum of $465,000 but it's now been reversed on appeal because the medical evidence submitted at trial was not based on a recent examination. There were additional reasons for the reversal in Nesci v. Romanelli but let's take a step back and look at the injuries, the jury verdict and the law surrounding the serious injury threshold - a law that's come under increasing attack from the plaintiff's bar.

As we write, Insurance Law 5102 is being considered by both houses of New York's legislature as they decide whether and to what extent to enact new laws designed to remedy some of the current inadequacies of the statute.

The injuries:

Mr. Nesci, a 51 year old x-ray technician, first sought medical treatment eight days after the accident (from an orthopedic surgeon) complaining of lower back and left shoulder pain. An MRI revealed spondylolothesis, mild central canal stenosis at L3-4 and a disc bulge at L4-5. He underwent eight months of physical therapy. About two tears later, a new MRI scan showed traumatically induced arthritis in his left shoulder. He claimed he could not return to work, participate in sports the way he used to or lift his arm above his head.

         Spondylolothesis is a disorder that causes the forward motion (slip) of one vertebral body over the one below. It is often the result of degenerative disc disease. Traumatic spondylolothesis is rare.

Mrs. Nesci, a 52 year old nurse, was taken to the hospital from the scene of the accident, treated for neck pain and released that night. She followed up with an orthopedist eight days later and an MRI later revealed that she had a herniated disc at C3-4. An EMG was positive for radiculopathy and she underwent eight months of physical therapy along with three steroid injections in her neck.

       Herniated disc vs. bulging disc:

The jury verdicts:

Mr. Nesci prevailed on his claims that he sustained a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, and also sustained a medically determined injury which prevented him from performing all of his daily activities for 90 of the first 180 days immediately following the accident. He was awarded $125,000 for his pain and suffering ($25,000 past - 3 1/2 years; $100,000 future - 20 years). He was also awarded $40,000 for loss of earnings.

Mrs. Nesci prevailed on the same serious injury thresholds (permanent consequential limitation of use and 90/180) in addition to a finding that she sustained a permanent loss of use of a body member, function or system. She was awarded pain and suffering damages in the sum of $250,000 ($50,000 past - 3 1/2 years, $200,000 future - 20 years).

The Appellate Court Reversal:

The judges gave short shrift to the 90/180 claims noting neither plaintiff came forward with evidence of an inability to perform daily activities and that Mrs. Nesci returned to her usual job within six weeks.

All of the other threshold categories that the jury ruled upon had an element of permanence and to meet that test a plaintiff must submit trial evidence of a recent medical examination. Neither plaintiff underwent any medical treatment at all within 15 months before trial and their medical expert (the treating orthopedist) last treated them in 2007 (May 2007 as to Mr. Nesci and December 2007 as to Mrs. Nesci). This lack of any recent medical examination led the judges to agree with the defense that the plaintiffs' medical testimony as to permanence was therefore conclusory and speculative.

Inside Information:

  • Mr. Nesci previously injured his shoulder in 2000 and missed four weeks of work as a result but at his deposition in this case testified he had never before injured his shoulder.
  • Mr. Nesci's doctor testified that the prior shoulder injury may have caused the arthritis now evident but Nesci had failed to make a claim of aggravation of a prior injury thus giving the court a separate basis to rule that the shoulder arthritis claim may not be presented to the jury (the defense is entitled to know if a plaintiff is claiming a brand new injury or an aggravation of an old one - or both).
  • There was a significant discrepancy as to Mrs. Nesci's cervical herniation claims. Her first MRI showed a herniation at C3-4 but her second one a year later showed a herniation at C5-6 and was silent as to C3-4. She also had a prior laminectomy in 1981.

Jury's Refusal to Award Any Future Pain and Suffering Damages Reversed on Appeal in New York Car Crash Lawsuit

When a defendant has been found liable causing for a car accident and the jury verdict includes amounts for past pain and suffering and future medical expenses but nothing at all for future pain and suffering, a new trial is required under New York law.

On August 22, 1996 Lindsay Grobman, then 17 years old, was a passenger in a car driven by Adam Chernoff. After a 30 mph head on collision, Lindsay was left complaining of head, neck and back pain.

What followed over the next four years until the trial of this case in Nassau County, New York was a fairly typical medical treatment scenario in car accident cases:

  • pain at the scene, ambulance to the hospital,
  • x-rays negative,
  • a week or more out of work,
  • return to work with pain,
  • diagnosis of cervical or lumbar herniated or bulging disks

Lindsay's pain persisted and finally an electroyogram (EMG) indicated nerve damage in her neck.

EMG involves testing the electrical activity of muscles and is often performed with a nerve conduction study to measure the conducting function of the nerves.

Here's what an EMG  looks like:

At trial four years after the accident, Lindsay still complained of the same pain which her doctor said was permanent and caused by herniated or bulging disks in her neck. The defense doctor testified she was fine and not hurt from the accident.

A trial on liability for the accident was held in June 2000 and the Nassau County jury found the driver 100% at fault for the accident. A second jury was directed to try only the issue of damages. In August 2001, the new jury found that Lindsay's neck and back injuries represented a permanent consequential limitation of the use of a body organ or member (one of the prerequisites under New York's Insurance Law Section 5102 before a person hurt in a car accident may recover any pain and suffering damages whatsoever). [My colleague Eric Turkewitz discusses some of the intricacies and nuances of this law over at New York Personal Injury Law Blog]

The jury awarded Lindsay Grobman damages in the total sum of $10,000 as follows:

  1. $1,100 for past pain and suffering (four years)
  2. $-0- for future pain and suffering
  3. $8,900 for future medical expenses (58 years)

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the verdict was inconsistent in finding a permanent injury and awarding damages for future medical expenses but failing to award any future pain and suffering damages. The appeals court agreed in Ajoudanpour v. Globman and ordered a new trial on damages. Instead, the plaintiff and defendant agreed, as was their right, to submit their case to an arbitrator who then conducted a hearing and in May 2005 rendered an award in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $125,000.

The arbitrator awarded $125,000 for Lindsay's pain and suffering essentially due to herniated disks in her neck that probably looked something like this:

 

A second and third appeal ensued concerning the arbitration procedure, the timing and amount of interest on the arbitrator's award and whether in general the award should be confirmed by the court. In the latest appeal, the court confirmed the award and reiterated that the jury's failure to award future pain and suffering damages was inappropriate.

This case is one of many in which jury verdicts appear to be inconsistent - either the product of confusion or perhaps too jurors' refusal to follow instructions from the trial judge. In this case, another factor may have been present: the legendary stinginess of Nassau County jurors and the growing trend of jurors disinclined to award significant pain and suffering damages in cases where there's been no surgery and there are few clearly objective signs of the injuries and pain complained of.

No doubt jurors in New York injury cases and elsewhere will continue to be confused in their deliberations and inconsistent in their pain and suffering awards. When they are and the appellate courts step in to issue corrective rulings, we will revisit these issues.