Multimillion Dollar Verdict Affirmed on Appeal for Man who Fell and was Run Over by Subway Train

James Sanders abused alcohol and heroin and he ended up in jail for a year. As a condition of his parole, he was placed in a methadone program at Kings County Hospital. At about 10 a.m. on December 12, 2002, the 41 year old Sanders went to his methadone clinic, got "medicated" and as he left he ran into an old friend with whom he drank five ounces of pure rum.

Methadone plus rum, a bad combination:

    

Sanders then went to the subway station to go home but at about 11 a.m. he fell onto the tracks and was run over, sustaining horrendous injuries.

We discussed the ensuing lawsuit and many of the injury details, here, and we predicted an appeal would follow the jury's verdict (a) that the subway motorman was 70% at fault and Sanders 30% and (b) awarding Sanders $6,000,000 for his pain and suffering damages (after apportionment).

In a stunning victory for the plaintiff in Sanders v. New York City Transit Authority (2d Dept. 2011), the appellate court has now affirmed the verdict in its entirety - both as to the liability split and the reasonableness of the damages awarded.

Affirming $8,550,000 for pain and suffering (before apportionment for comparative fault) was not the stunning part of this decision. After all, plaintiff sustained the following injuries:

  • below-the-knee amputation of his right leg
  • total blindness of one eye (resulting from trauma to his sixth cranial nerve)
  • loss of much of the big toe on his left leg
  • chronic phantom pain and pain where his prosthesis meets his stump
  • fractures of facial bones and his mandible (jaw) with chronic facial and mouth pain
  • severed right ear that had to be sewn back onto his face
  • head injury with piece of skull removed and post-traumatic seizures requiring anti-seizure medication Depakote

Man learning to walk again with a below-the-knee prosthesis:

The court did not cite any prior cases to support its affirmance on damages; however there are two cases that are quite relevant as to the amount of pain and suffering damages:

  1. Firmes v. Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. (2d Dept. 2008), previously discussed by us, here - $5,000,000 reduced from $7,400,000 for a 23 year old who sustained a below-the-knee amputation in a motor vehicle accident, underwent 11 surgeries and was unable to use a prosthesis
  2. Villaseca v. City of New York (1st. Dept. 2008),  previously discussed by us, here - $5,000,000 reduced from $8,000,000 for a 50 year old blinded in one eye who had pre-existing macular degeneration in the other eye, thus leaving him with almost no vision at all

The big battle in this case - both at trial and on appeal - was over liability. Plaintiff contended that he fell when the train was hundreds of feet away. Defendant argued that plaintiff fell in front of a train that was no more than 20 feet away. The parties (and their engineering experts) agreed that a subway motorman will not be liable and an accident is unavoidable when a person falls onto the tracks only 20 feet away from a train moving as slow as 15 m.p.h (as here); however there was also agreement that there would be liability, and an accident would be avoidable, where a person falls onto the tracks when a train at 15 m.p.h. is 100 or more feet away.

Conceding the mathematics of perception and stopping time, plaintiff's trial attorney, the noted Gary Pillersdorf, boldly stated in his opening statement: "But if in fact my client fell when the train was 20 feet away, I apologize for wasting your time."

So the big issue to be determined at trial was how far away the train was when Sanders fell onto the tracks. And that's where things got very heated at trial and on appeal.

Defense counsel argued that Sanders was not telling the truth, "he's lying to you from start to finish" and that there could be no basis for finding the motorman at fault in view of the following evidence:

  • the motorman swore at trial that plaintiff fell when the train was no more than 20 feet away
  • a disinterested witness stated the train was 10-12 feet away, but certainly no more than 30-40 feet
  • plaintiff stated at a pre-trial deposition that he had no idea where the train was when he fell ("I don't remember where the train was when I fell.")

Plaintiff's counsel contended that:

  • Sanders testified at trial that just before he fell he looked and the train was not yet in the station
  • the disinterested witness was not credible and not disclosed until until the middle of trial although he gave a statement to defendant's investigators four days after the accident

Inside Information:

  • Defense counsel argued that the case should have been dismissed because before trial plaintiff submitted a sham affidavit stating the train was hundreds of feet away when he fell. The affidavit was brought to plaintiff one night by a law firm employee who told him that unless he signed it his case would be dismissed. It contradicted plaintiff's deposition testimony (that he had no idea where the train was) and the defense argued the affidavit was feigned, especially so because at trial plaintiff admitted he'd never read it before signing. The appellate court rejected this argument simply stating that there was no conflict between plaintiff's affidavit and his deposition testimony.
  • Plaintiff testified at trial that he recovered memory of the accident as a result of attending group therapy sessions.
  • Plaintiff's engineering expert, Nicholas Bellizzi, testified that the subway car should have come equipped with a black-box-data recorder and that the defense hid crucial information pointing to liability by failing to produce the recorder. The defense argued that there was no such evidence and that this claim was an improper diversion.
  • Plaintiff at first denied drinking rum but in view of toxicology evidence to the contrary, he admitted drinking in a car with his friend just before the accident (and just after drinking methadone too). Toxicology experts at trial agreed that Sanders was impaired (though not intoxicated).

 

Leg Amputated After Drunk College Student Struck By Subway Train - $2,300,000 Pain and Suffering Jury Verdict

A college student, Dustin Dibble, was out on the town for four hours drinking with his buddies, he got drunk (blood alcohol level more than two times the legal limit for driving), ended up on the subway tracks (he doesn't know how he got there) and lost his leg below his knee when he was run over by a New York City subway train. This week, a Manhattan jury awarded him $2,300,000 for his pain and suffering. The jury found that while Dibble was 35% at fault, the subway  operator was 65% at fault and that the total pain and suffering damages for this below the knee amputation injury would have been $3,500,000 (were the city 100% at fault). Applying  the rules of comparative negligence, Dibble got 65% or $2,300,000.

And now, the New York Post, other newspapers, the blogosphere (here, here, and here) and even politicians are all abuzz about this case that appears outrageous to many.

The mayor of New York City has spoken out calling the jury's verdict  "incomprehensible" and suggesting that the issue of "personal responsibility [on Dibble's part]" should have but did not carry the day in court.

No doubt too, this case will bring up anew discussions among leading writers, academics and think-tankers who, such as Walter Olson, blogging at Overlawyered, often grapple with issues of personal responsibility and comparative fault in injury cases.

To put this case into some perspective, we need to look at a couple of leading appellate cases that dealt with similar issues. In Soto v. New York City Transit Authority, New York's highest court ruled that an 18 year old's reckless behavior (getting drunk, running after a subway train to catch up to it and board it and then getting struck by it) was not of such a nature as to constitute the sole legal cause of his injuries (bilateral below the knee amputations). Therefore, the court held that the train operator's duties were not vitiated and the plaintiff could try to convince a jury that the operator bore all or some of the responsibility for the accident. Like Mr. Dibble, the plaintiff in the Soto case claimed that even though he was drunk, the conductor could have and should have seen him in time to stop and was therefore negligent.

In a more recent case, Mirjah v. New York City Transit Authority, an appellate court found in favor of the subway operator. In that case, a drunk sitting on the subway tracks was killed when run over by a subway car coming into the station. The court dismissed the ensuing wrongful death lawsuit without a trial because it was undisputed that the train operator exercised reasonable care and the accident was unavoidable under the circumstances.

As to the damages for pain and suffering in traumatic below the knee amputation cases, it appears that the jury's evaluation was reasonable and that if the liability verdict is upheld (this case will be appealed), then the damages verdict will not likely be disturbed by the appellate court. For example, in Bondi v. Bambrick, the appellate court upheld a $9,750,000  pain and suffering damages award ($2,250,000 past, $7,500,000 future) for a  35 year old woman who was a passenger on a motorcycle struck by a drunk driver. She had been a very active woman, underwent nine surgeries prior to trial, was left with pervasive scarring and a wound at the amputation site that would never heal, was unable to have a permanent prosthetic, would require revision surgery every 18 months and was in permanent pain.

In Miller v. Long Island Rail Road, the appellate court ruled that $3,250,000 was proper for pain and suffering damages ($1,300,000 past, $1,950,000 future) for a plaintiff who suffered a below the knee amputation when he was nine years old and fell off a train and was crushed. The plaintiff was active in sports after the accident and became a medal-winning swimmer in high school and a member of the varsity track team.

So, back to the fault issues in these types of cases. Should these intoxicated plaintiffs even be permitted to present their claims to juries? Should their cases be dismissed? Should there be a law -- a statute -- that stops them from suing? These are some of the issues that will confront the courts, and society as a whole, time and again.

The defense in the Soto case argued (unsuccessfully) just these policy points:

  • When a person has been reckless, becomes drunk, should he be barred from the courthouse in these types of cases?
  • Does requiring defendants in these types of cases to take precautions conflict with other interests such as efficiency, or the safety of others not directly involved in plaintiffs' dangerous activities?
  • Would allowing plaintiff to recover deliver a message at odds with socially accepted norms or values.?

These issues will not soon disappear and we will surely be revisiting them as new cases are brought, new verdicts are rendered and, perhaps, new statutes are enacted.