New York Injury Cases Blog : New York Personal Injury Lawyer & Attorney : John Hochfelder Law Firm : Traumatic Injury, Wrongful Death

On March 12, 2002, Thomas Dockery, a 34 year old cable splicer for Verizon, suffered a grand mal seizure in his sleep of unknown origin. He'd never before had a seizure so he was rushed by ambulance to Peninsula Hospital in Far Rockaway, New York.

At the hospital, a CT scan was interpreted as normal. An MRI two days later, though, was interpreted as showing a lesion that seemed to be a glioma (a central nervous system tumor) and Dockery was immediately referred to M. Chris Overby, M.D., a neurosurgeon, who concurred. A second opinion from Philip Gutin, M.D. of Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in Manhattan corroborated Dr. Overby’s diagnosis and surgery was set for March 25th.

At first, doctors thought Dockery had a brain tumor and here are several types:

A pre-surgical MRI on March 24th, though, indicated an inconsistent massive edema of the brain and Dockery underwent a craniotomy the next day during which pus in the lesion area was removed and found to be a non-tumorous abscess that had grown rapidly during the prior several days and caused an edema that produced herniation of the brain.

In a craniotomy, surgeons cut into the skull to access the brain, like this:

After several more brain surgeries, five weeks in the hospital and three and a half years of extensive rehabilitation, Mr. Dockery was left with severe aphasia – a loss of the ability to produce and/or comprehend language and a severe loss of memory.

Dockery (and his wife) sued claiming malpractice in the doctors’ failure to have properly and timely diagnosed his condition and removed the abscess by March 18th when his injuries could have been avoided.

During the trial, the judge dismissed claims against Peninsula Hospital and the doctors there but, in July 2007, after six weeks of testimony, a Queens County jury returned a verdict finding that there was malpractice by Dr. Overby (45%) and Dr. Gutin and his hospital (55%) and they awarded non-economic damages in the sum of $104,450,000.

                
Here’s how the $104,450,000 non-economic damages verdict broke down:

• Pain and suffering - $37,750,000 ($10,000,000 past – 5 years; $27,750,000 future – 36 years)
• Loss of consortium (wife's claim) - $66,700,000  ($18,000,000 past; $48,700,000 future).

Just before trial, Dr. Gutin and Memorial Sloan Kettering had settled for $4,400,000.

And just after the verdict, the trial judge dismissed the claims against Dr. Overby finding that the verdict against him was against the weight of the credible evidence (because he saw Dockery only once before Dr. Gutin took over and made a new diagnosis that was relied upon by Dockery and proved to be negligent).

The Dockerys thus gained no new money as a result of the trial because Dr. Gutin and Memorial Sloan Kettering had already settled and Dr. Overby's post-trial motion to dismiss the claims against him, notwithstanding the verdict, was granted.

In the ensuing appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the judge should not have dismissed the claims against Peninsula Hospital and its doctors, nor the claims against Dr. Overby. Conversely, the defendants argued that the dismissals were properly granted and, alternatively, that the damages verdict was grossly excessive.

On December 22, 2009, in Dockery v. Sprecher (2nd Dept., 2009), the appellate court upheld the dismissal as to Peninsula Hospital and its doctors, reinstated some liability against Dr. Overby (10%), found that Dr. Gutin and Memorial Sloan Kettering were 90% at fault and ruled that the non-economic damages should be reduced to $9,100,000.

Here are the non-economic damages reductions:

• past pain and suffering – from $10,000,000 to $1,000,000
• future pain and suffering – from $27,750,000 to $6,750,000
• loss of consortium – from $48,700,000 to $1,350,000

The jury had awarded $470,000 in economic damages (mostly for lost earnings) which the appellate court did not disturb so the resulting new total damages award is $9,570,000.

The net result is that plaintiffs' total recovery is now $5,357,000, as follows:

• $4,400,000 (the pre-trial settlement with Dr. Gutin and his hospital) plus
• $957,000 (Dr. Overby's 10% share of the new $9,570,000 verdict)

Inside Information:

• The appellate court decision was difficult to unravel as to what really happened and its practical effects. My colleague, Eric Turkewitz over at New York Personal Injury Law Blog has taken the court to task for its “tortured language” and the “open questions” its decision left for readers.
• If there were a retrial in this case, the looks on the faces of plaintiffs’ counsel and the trial judge (Hon. Duane A. Hart) when in court together again would be something to behold. Counsel claimed that the judge handled the lawyers and witnesses rather roughly and therefore made the unusual request that any retrial be held before a different judge. The appeals judges ignored that request (and the fact that this judge has been censured twice by the Commission on Judicial Conduct for his actions towards lawyers during trials).
• Counsel for Dr. Overby has indictated that he will make a motion to reargue this decision and/or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals based upon well settled law that provides one is not liable when one's negligence, if any, is superseded by an intervening act that caused the injuries complained of. Dr. Overby has long maintained that whatever he did or didn't do regarding Mr. Dockery could not as a matter of law result in a finding of liability against him because it was Dr. Gutin who took over treatment after only one day and Dr. Gutin's actions or inactions were the key to any malpractice. We will follow this case and report on any significant new developments.

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Defendants routinely and successfully argue in back and neck injury cases that  plaintiff’s injuries pre-existed an accident and no pain and suffering damages should be awarded (even if defendant is found to have caused the new accident). There’s merit to the argument but it’s not as simple as I’ve implied.

Under New York law, a plaintiff who’s been injured before is still entitled to recover pain and suffering damages resulting from a new injury to the same body part; however, a plaintiff is only entitled to damages to the extent to which he’s been further disabled or injured as a result of the new accident.

And, a plaintiff must make the aggravation or exacerbation of injury claim in his lawsuit pleadings before a trial judge will tell the jury that they may make an award for the increased pain and suffering. Otherwise, a plaintiff has to prove that all of his injuries were caused in the new accident and the defendant will win by convincing the jury that plaintiff’s injuries predated the current accident.

Plaintiffs usually claim that their preexisting neck and back injuries were resolved and that for years they had returned to prior levels of activity and were pain free. Now, they say, new trauma has caused new injuries, especially herniated discs, and they are in great pain and disabled as a result. The problem is, though, that magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) which illustrates the herniated discs very often is interpreted to show degenerative disc disease. When that happens, defense doctors will testify that the degeneration means plaintiff has preexisting disc disease and that it’s unclear what, if any, new spinal injuries were caused by the recent trauma.

With this background, we now turn to the case of Leslie Rodgers, a 40 year old man who was struck by a city bus at about 8 a.m. on September 23, 2003 while in the crosswalk on Gates Avenue at its intersection with Franklin Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. He was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where he was treated for minor back and other injuries and released. A month later, an MRI showed a herniated disc at L5-S1 with impingement on the S1 nerve root. Rodgers began a long course of conservative treatment including physical therapy, chiropractic treatment and two epidural steroid injections.

Finally, after three years, Rodgers underwent back surgery: a laminotomy and diskectomy at L5-S1. During the surgery, the doctor plucked out a disc fragment that had been impinging upon a nerve.

Here is what the diskectomy procedure looks like:

Post-operatively, Mr. Rodgers was much improved but his pain soon returned and at trial he testified that he was in great pain and disabled. He complained of intermittent numbness and pain up and down one leg with low back pain lasting all day and night. His surgeon opined that these conditions would be permanent. That meant Rodgers could no longer return to his job (at Fortune Society assisting HIV positive ex-convicts find housing); nor would he ever again enjoy basketball, handball or running.

The jury assessed pain and suffering at $1,400,000 ($200,000 past - 4 1/2  years; $1,200,000 future – 25 years).

The city appealed asserting:

1. that there was evidence that Rodgers had degenerative disc disease before the accident (the MRI a month after the accident revealed an osteophyte growth at the site of plaintiff’s L5-S1 herniation as well as desiccation and degeneration of the disc),
2. that he failed to make a claim in the lawsuit that the bus accident injuries may have been due, at least in part, to his preexisting condition and
3. that the trial judge should not have instructed the jury that they could award damages for plaintiff’s increased susceptibility to injury

Here is a comparison of normal, healthy discs with degenerated discs with osteophytes:

Last week, in Rodgers v. New York City Transit Authority (2nd Dept. 2010), the appellate judges agreed with the city and ordered a new trial, thus vacating the entire jury verdict (Rodgers was also awarded $1,000,000 for past and future lost earnings).

The trial judge had told the jury they could award pain and suffering damages for all of the injuries suffered by Rodgers if they found that his prior physical condition left him more susceptible to greater injuries than a healthy person (i.e., one without preexisting degenerative disc disease). The defense claimed it was prejudiced by this charge (Pattern Jury Instruction 2:283) in that plaintiff had proceeded in the lawsuit for years on the sole theory that all of his injuries were caused by the bus accident and he had never once put the defense on notice that some injuries may have been exacerbated or due to his prior condition that had left him with an increased susceptibility or the possibility of asymptomatic conditions becoming symptomatic. The appellate court agreed and ruled that the jury’s verdict was improper because it may have included damages for injuries that Mr. Rodgers sustained before the bus accident.

In the new trial, the jury will consider only those injuries actually caused by the bus accident and they may award pain and suffering damages only for those new injuries. That’s a huge win for the defense in that it will be very hard for Rodgers to convince the jury that he sustained any new injuries at all in view of his preexisting condition.

Inside Information:

• Before the accident, plaintiff had been a drug addict and served 12 years in prison for participating in a kidnapping (by the time of trial he had become a productive member of society, working and enrolled in a Ph.D. program at Hunter College).
• Plaintiff claimed unfair surprise too – only three days before jury selection the defense notified plaintiff’s counsel that a defense radiologist would testify that plaintiff’s injuries were preexisting.
• The jury apportioned liability 80% on the city and 20% on the plaintiff and in the new trial that apportionment will stand with the new jury considering only the issues of which injuries (and the amount of damages), if any, were caused by the bus accident.
   

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On July 29, 2002, then 16 year old Jennifer Gillette underwent a procedure by podiatrist Greg Atlas in which a wart was removed from the side of her left heel.

Complications developed, she was forced to undergo five new surgeries and Jennifer ended up suing Dr. Atlas claiming that he negligently performed the procedure and that he never properly informed her of the substantial risks involved in the way he did it.

Seven years later, on August 18, 2009, an Orange County, New York jury awarded her $3,000,000 for her pain and suffering ($1,500,000 past, $1,500,000 future – 55 years).

The jury based liability only on the so-called informed consent claim. That’s a long-standing legal principle under which a doctor may be held liable to his patient when:

1. he fails to disclose alternatives to the treatment given and fails to inform his patient of the reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the planned procedure,
2. a reasonably prudent patient would not have undergone the treatment had she been fully informed, and
3. the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury.

A plantar wart caused by the human papilloma virus (HPV) that appears as a small lesion on the foot and typically presents as a cauliflower. It looks like this:

Plantar warts tend to be painful and can be spread in showers and swimming pools. Treatment usually involves peeling away of the dead surface skin cells with chemicals, acid or liquid nitrogen. Lasers are often used too. Surgery is a last resort.

In Jennifer Gillette’s case,  the doctor excised the wart with a scalpel, a procedure she said at trial she was unaware of until the moment it happened. She had expected laser treatment only.

Dr. Atlas told the jury that he told Jennifer (and her mother) that the risks of the procedure involved skin infection, scaring and repetition of the procedure. Critically, though, he did not tell her that the excision procedure could result in the rupture of her Achilles tendon and he did not tell her about alternate, conservative, methods he could have used to remove the wart.

Here’s what happened after the office procedure:

• development of hypertrophic and keloid scar
• three rounds of steroid injections into the back of her heel overlying the Achilles tendon
• development of soft tissue deficiency, tendinosis and Achilles tendon degeneration

Jennifer underwent five surgeries before trial including a Haglund’s type excision (removal of a bony protuberance of her calcaneus - the heelbone) and an Achilles tendon debridement, repair, transfer and release.

For the seven years from the date of the wart excision procedure until trial, Jennifer was substantially restricted to a wheelchair, crutch and/or cane assisted ambulation. When standing and walking could be accomplished, it was only for short periods of time.

As to Jennifer’s claim for future pain and suffering, the jury heard credible testimony from experts that she’d forever suffer:

• permanent loss of function of her left big toe (due to the tendon transfer surgery),
• less functional and likely failure or degeneration of her Achilles tendon (now a transposed, smaller tendon),
• chronic pain in the Achilles insertion, and
• inability to return to any of the many recreational endeavors previously enjoyed without restrictions.

While the jury returned a verdict for every dime of the $3,000,000 requested in summation by plaintiff’s attorney, the trial judge found the award excessive and reduced it to $1,000,000 ($500,000 past, $500,000 future) [Gillette v. Atlas - Supreme Court, Orange County, 1/22/10; Index # 3844/06.]

Under New York’s CPLR 4404, the trial judge’s decision is conditional. That means that either the plaintiff agrees to the reduction or there will be a new trial (limited to determining anew the amount of damages).

Inside Information:

• the jury found that the defendant had not committed malpractice either by determining to remove the wart by scalpel and laser or by injecting steroids afterwards but they did find that appropriate information had not been given to Jennifer and that had she been given the information she would not have consented to the scalpel excision procedure
• the defendant had offered plaintiff a high-low agreement under which, no matter what the verdict, the defense would pay at least $500,000 but no more than $1,500,000 – meaning that if there were a defense verdict Jennifer would nonetheless receive $500,000 and if, as it turned out, the jury awarded more than $1,500,000 then she’d get $1,500,000
• My sources tell me this case will now settle for $1,000,000. If so, Jennifer should have taken the high-low deal under which she'd have received $1,500,000

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Personal injury lawyers are often asked, "Can I sue?" I always answer, "Yes, of course." But the real question is whether the inquiring plaintiff will win and in school sports injury lawsuits the answer is almost always, "No way."

Time and again school kids are injured playing football, basketball, baseball and other sports in competition or just in gym class. And, too often, their parents, urged on by lawyers, end up suing school coaches and gym teachers on the theory that some obligation owed to the student was breached by the school personnel.

I say "too often" because most of these cases are dismissed before trial. And that's just what happened in the latest such case arising out of Pleasantville, New York - a bucolic village in Westchester County near the Hudson River established in 1695.

On March 17, 2006, then 12 year old Sean Bramswig, a 7th grader, was playing floor hockey in middle school gym class when a teammate accidentally struck him in the mouth with a plastic hockey stick. They had just scored a goal and were at half-court for the ensuing face-off when Sean was hit.

Here's what a face-off looks like in floor hockey:

Sean's parents brought a lawsuit for their son's injuries (described below) asserting claims that the school was:

1. negligent in its supervision and instruction of students with respect to hockey equipment and play and
2. negligent in failing to provide Sean with proper safety equipment

After a year and a half of proceedings in Bramswig v. Pleasantville Middle School, including the depositions of Sean and his parents, the gym teacher and other school personnel, and after both sides hired expensive so called recreational activity experts, the school district asked the judge to toss the suit. In making a motion for summary judgment, the defendants asserted that:

• there were no significant factual disputes between the parties that needed a jury determination
• legal principles and precedent established that defendants could not be liable since there were two teachers supervising the game
• there was no horseplay or fooling around when the incident occurred
• the incident was so sudden that no amount of supervision, however intense, would have succeeded in preventing it
• the kids were given protective goggles and mouth guards were not required

The judge pretty much agreed with the defense. He dismissed that portion of the case that was based on negligence in failing to require mouth guards. That was easy (and that claim should never have been asserted) because of clear and recent precedent - the case of Walker v. Comack School District (2nd Dept. 1996) already established that goggles are enough protection and schools need not provide mouth guards to students playing floor hockey.

As to the claim of negligent instruction, though, the judge allowed the case to proceed. It was undisputed that the teachers had advised the kids they were not to "high stick" but the judge agreed with the plaintiffs that the teacher may have failed to properly instruct the students about the differences and dangers involved in high sticking above one's knees versus high sticking above one's waist.

On the defendants' appeal, the appellate judges dismissed the only remaining aspect of the case  (negligent instruction). Since Sean was struck by a teammate who high sticked above his waist, the court reasoned that it mattered not at all whether the kids were told of any distinction between high sticking above the knees or the waist.

This entire case should never have been commenced. It should have been clear to the plaintiffs' attorneys that it was a loser. Winning sports injury cases in New York is hard enough under almost any set of facts, as we discussed here.

To boot, though, Sean's injuries just weren't all that severe (and his medical expenses were submitted to insurance). According to Sean's bill of particulars (in which one is required to specify injuries), Sean's injuries were:

• four front teeth which were "pushed backwards" and required oral surgery to be stabilized.
• a cut lip and stitches
• missed almost two weeks of gym class 

The lawsuit was finally dismissed in full by the appeals court just three days before Christmas when many kids were hoping simply for two front teeth:

Inside Information:

Plaintiffs' attorneys are well-known as a "defense firm" - one that represents insurance companies in the defense of bodily injury lawsuits. On rare occasions (when the injury is quite severe and the liability of the defendant quite obvious), a defense firm will represent a plaintiff. One wonders why, though, Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt ever took on this case (i.e., one with minimal injuries and little prospect of proving fault on the defendants' part). I suspect it had to do with a pre-existing personal relationship with the parents. The firm would have been better served by taking a pass on this case.

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On August 15, 2004, then 20 year old Ervin Jordan was on his bicycle in Wyandanch, New York (Suffolk County) attempting to cross a road known as Straight Path at its intersection with State Avenue.

Jordan was peddling along, just like this fellow:

At the same time, and on State Avenue only a block away from Jordan, a county police officer received a dispatch advising of a robbery in progress. The police officer made a quick U-turn and headed to the crime scene. He didn’t get very far. Though he saw Jordan on his bicycle, the police officer slammed right into him.

It wasn't this one but here's a classic Suffolk County police car:

In the ensuing personal injury lawsuit, the county claimed that Jordan could not prove that the officer drove with reckless disregard for the safety of others. That standard is higher and much more difficult to prove than ordinary negligence. Under New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1104, that standard is applied in favor of police officers in car accidents while responding to a police call.

The Suffolk County jury that heard this case ruled that the officer had indeed been reckless.

In the trial on damages that followed, the jury was apprised of plaintiff’s injuries:

• fractured tibia and fibula in both legs with bone chips and butterfly fragments in each
• open reduction internal fixation in both legs with rods and screws
• compartment syndrome (the compression of nerves and blood vessels within an enclosed space) requiring two additional surgeries know as fasciotomies (surgical incisions to relieve neurovascular pressure in a muscle compartment)
  
• skin graft procedures on both legs each leaving 28 cm scars
• continuing pain, limited range of motion and inability to pursue athletics or activities with his two young children

Here is what compartment syndrome looks like in the lower leg area:

After evaluating all of those injuries (which required a three week hospitalization followed by six weeks in a rehabilitation facility), the jury awarded plaintiff $100,000 for his pain and suffering ($50,000 past – 3 ½ years, $50,000 future – 51 years).

The trial judge, though, found that sum inadequate and ordered an increase to $750,000 ($250,000 past, $500,000 future). The defendant appealed and last week in Jordan v. County of Suffolk (2nd Dept. 2010), the appellate judges agreed with the lower court judge and upheld the increase to $750,000.

The appellate court decision disclosed nothing at all about the nature of the injuries and it also failed to set forth the reasons for upholding the trial judge’s increase. The trial judge’s decision in Jordan v. County of Suffolk did discuss the injury details but the judge’s references to allegedly relevant prior cases supporting his decision are not very helpful. The judge cited these four cases:

1. Brandwein v. New York City Transit Authority (1st Dept. 2005) – dealing with an ankle fracture sustained by a 26 year old woman who thereafter underwent three surgeries and at trial was awarded $30,000 by the jury for her past pain and suffering and nothing for the future. The appellate court increased the past pain and suffering sum to $60,000 but affirmed the denial of any future award because the plaintiff’s subsequent injuries were fund to have been due to a pre-existing degenerative disease known as Charcot-Marie-Tooth Syndrome.
2. Kane v. Coundorous (1st Dept. 2004) – the appellate court sustained $250,000 for future pain and suffering for a man who suffered a herniated disc in his back and underwent a failed laminectomy and subsequent spinal fusion
3. Fischl v. Carbone (2nd Dept. 1993) – the appellate court sustained a pain and suffering award of $515,000 ($300,000 past – 7 years, $215,000 future) for injuries to a 29 year old athletic veterinarian including spiral fractures of her tibia and fibula, leaving her with a disfigured leg and unable to resume sports or her prior profession
4. Shurgan v. Tedesco (2nd Dept. 1992) – the appellate court sustained the trial judge’s increase of the jury’s pain and suffering award to $150,000 in a facial scarring case

While the judges in Jordan v. County of Suffolk  properly increased the award (and they could have evaluated the pain and suffering of Mr. Jordan at much more than $750,000 without being unreasonably generous), they nonetheless either did not explain their reasons for the higher awards or (as to the trial judge) purported to so so by citing prior cases that have little relevance.

Here are two cases (just from the Appellate Division's 2nd Dept.) that the judges could and should have cited and discussed:

• Brown v. Elliston (2nd Dept. 2008) - $700,000 ($300,000 past, $400,000 future) for a 53 year old man with comminuted fractures to the shaft of his tibia and fibula requiring open reduction and internal fixation of a rod down the length of his shin
• Bajwa v. Saida, Inc. (2nd Dept. 2004) - $700,000 for a 61 year old construction worker with  spiral fractures of his tibia and fibula requiring open reduction and internal fixation with an intermedullary rod

Perhaps the judges would have found useful our review of tibia and fibula fracture lawsuits and appellate decisions, here.

  Inside Information:

• The jury determined that both parties were negligent and they assigned 25% of the fault to Jordan. Therefore, his gross recovery was reduced from $750,000 to $562,500
• In his closing, plaintiff's attorney, Oscar Michelen had asked the jury for a pain and suffering verdict of $1,000,000. I hear that when the county attorney told the appellate judges in oral argument  that $100,000 was a reasonable sum for Mr. Jordan's injuries one of the judges was so surprised that he blurted out, "Maybe in 1920." Clearly, he and his colleagues on the bench had a much higher figure in mind. And clearly, too, Mr. Michelen's request for $1,000,000 for his client was reasonable and his advocacy was superlative.

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Kerwin Park was a 36 year old day laborer doing construction work on a residential building in Manhattan on September 7, 2000 when a wooden plank he’d been standing on collapsed and sent him tumbling 20 feet to the unfinished basement below.

Here's what it looked like before Mr. Park fell:

Park was rushed to the hospital where he was diagnosed with a displaced, comminuted, intra-articular fracture of his right elbow’s olecranon (as well as a non-displaced fracture of his left wrist). 

Here's what an olecranon fracture looks like:

He required open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) surgery in which the elbow fracture fragments were pushed into place and then tension band wiring and pins were used to create compression at the elbow fracture site, like this:

Park underwent a second surgery to remove the hardware within a year after his accident. Then, he underwent 10 months of physical therapy. In the interim, he undertook nursing courses and he then pursued a new career as a certified nursing attendant taking care of elderly patients.

In the ensuing lawsuit against the premises owner, a contractor and others, Park claimed he wasn’t provided a safe place to work or proper equipment. After extensive pre-trial procedures and motions, Park was finally granted summary judgment on liability and a Manhattan jury returned a pain and suffering damages verdict in his favor in the sum of $2,300,000 ($1,500,000 past – 7 ½ years, $800,000 future – 33 years).

On the defendant’s post-trial motion, the trial judge reduced the verdict to $1,400,000 ($600,000 past, $800,000 future) and plaintiff then appealed.

Park argued on appeal that the original jury verdict of $2,300,000 should be reinstated in full while the defense argued that the trial judge’s reduction to $1,400,000 was not enough and the verdict should be reduced even further.

Last week, in Park v. City of New York, the judges of the Appellate Division, First Department agreed with the defendants and the judges reduced the future damages verdict another $400,000 so that the final pain and suffering verdict now stands at $1,000,000 ($600,000 past, $400,000 future).

The trial testimony by plaintiff and his doctors was at odds with that offered by the doctor who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants. While there was no dispute as to the initial seriousness of plaintiff’s elbow fracture and the need for the significant surgery he underwent, the parties vigorously disputed the seriousness of plaintiff’s condition at trial and his prognosis:

• Pain: plaintiff testified he has pain every day and cannot ride a bike, play basketball or lift heavy objects; defendants pointed out, though, that plaintiff missed no time from work, showers, feed and helps his patients walk (in his new job as a nursing attendant) and that he has pain only in certain positions
• Future Surgery: plaintiff’s orthopedist claimed he’d need future elbow surgery due to post-traumatic arthritis but the defense doctor disagreed testifying that there was no evidence of arthritis and no need for more surgery
• Wrist Injury: plaintiff claimed residual pain in his left (non-dominant) wrist but the defense argued that the wrist injury was insignificant as it was treated only with a bandage, didn’t require any surgery and plaintiff testified before trial that he had good range of motion and no pain in his wrist

In reducing the plaintiff’s verdict $400,000 more than the trial judge had already reduced it – leaving plaintiff with $1,300,000 less than the jury had awarded him – the appellate judges stated that they based their decision on four prior cases involving “a comminuted fracture to the elbow/arm, multiple surgeries, potential additional surgery and permanent pain and limitation of motion.” Only one of those cases, though, Roshwalb v. Regency Maritime Corp. (1^st Dept. 1992), involved an elbow fracture ($750,000 sustained for 63 year old woman).

The other three cases cited in Park v. City of New York all involved fractures to different parts of the arm:

• Baez v. New York City Transit Authority (1^st Dept. 2005) - $980,000 for 56 year old woman with comminuted, midshaft humeral fracture [we previously discussed this case in our article on humerus fracture cases, here]
• Martinez v. Gouverneur Gardens Housing Corp. (1^st Dept. 1992) - $800,000 for 3 ½ year old boy with comminuted fracture of his arm, shortening and atrophy
• Fudali v. New York City Transit Authority (Supreme Court, New York County, 2005) - $1,200,000 for 59 year old woman with humeral neck and head fracture)

While there aren’t any cases that the judges failed to mention in Park v. City of New York that would likely have led them to a different conclusion, there were several prior cases that involved elbow fractures only that were much more relevant and instructive. Here they are (some of which we discussed in our prior article on elbow fracture cases):

• Flores v. Parkchester Preservation Co. (1^st Dept. 2007) - $350,000 for 24 year old woman with an intra-articular elbow fracture
• Vertsberger v. City of New York (2^nd Dept. 2006) - $1,400,000 for 51 year old man with comminuted intertrochanteric elbow fracture
• Chisolm v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc. (1^st Dept. 2001) - $400,000 for 15 year old boy comminuted elbow fracture
• Boinoff v. Riverbay Corp. (1^st Dept. 1997) - $100,000 for 58 year old woman with badly fractured elbow
• Carrasquillo v. City of New York (Supreme Court, Kings County 2009) - $1,200,000 for six year old with supracondylar fracture of her elbow [link is to the October 5, 2009 trial judge decision rendered after our earlier article discussing the $3,200,000 jury verdict]

The point in referring to the more relevant elbow fracture cases is not that the court in Park v. City of New York erroneously evaluated pain and suffering damages; rather, it’s to highlight the fact that elbow fractures are usually more significantly limiting and painful than mid-shaft humerus fractures.

The elbow involves a complex joint with three moving parts (the radius, ulna and humerus) and after elbow surgery it's typical that there will be some significant permanent loss of range of motion. The judges could and should have cited the more relevant elbow fracture cases, discussed them and enlightened all of us as to why it was proper to reduce Mr. Park’s verdict by $400,000 (after the trial judge had already reduced it by $900,000).

Inside Information:

Before trial, plaintiff had demanded $750,000 to settle against which defendants had offered $350,000.

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We wrote about this tragic case last August, here, and can now report that the estate of Michael Colombini has settled all of the claims arising out of his death in 2001. Bearing full responsibility, Westchester County Health Care Corp. (the formal name of Westchester Medical Center in Valhalla, New York) has agreed to pay $2,900,000.

Michael Colombini had been undergoing a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) test at the hospital on July 26, 2001 when a hospital nurse brought an oxygen tank into the MRI room and, as it was made of ferrous metal, the oxygen tank was propelled missile-like into the machine where it struck Michael’s head as he lay sedated being tested for a brain tumor. He died two days later.

This type of oxygen tank, made of aluminum alloy, is ideal for MRI departments where non-ferrous materials are a must:

Within days, the hospital assumed full responsibility and later offered $1,000,000 to settle quietly. The offer was declined and extensive litigation ensued not only against the hospital but also against nine other defendants (including doctors, a nurse, technicians, the MRI suite administration company and the MRI manufacturer). Claims were made for wrongful death, pre-death conscious pain and suffering and punitive damages.

After nine years of pre-trial discovery (such as depositions and document exchanges), motion practice (the defendants sought dismissal on technical grounds more than once) and an appeal, the hospital increased its offer by nearly three-fold and the case is now over. A court order approving the settlement was signed last week.

The settlement is significant because it's a large recovery by New York law standards for the death of a child (the New York State Trial Lawyers Association vigorously opposes as unfair the limiting laws in New York regarding damages allowed in child death cases). And, to the extent that the settlement represents a recovery for Michael’s pain and suffering, $2,900,000 appears to exceed the amounts sustained in appeals in all prior New York cases dealing with short periods of pre-death pain and suffering.

So why did the hospital pay so much to settle? Three reasons:

1. looming punitive damage claims
2. the possibility of a significant emotional distress verdict in favor of Michael’s father (who was at the scene) and
3. the tenacity and reputation of the Colombini family lawyers Tom Moore and Matthew Gaier

Punitive damages are very rarely awarded or sustained on appeal in a negligence or medical malpractice case. They are viable only when it’s proven that a defendant engaged in conduct evincing an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others.

In this case, that claim was made against several defendants but as to the operator of the MRI suite – University Imaging Medical Corp. (“UIM”) – it looked like there was a good chance plaintiff would prevail.

UIM made a motion back in 2004 to have the punitive damages claim against it thrown out. The trial judge granted the motion and tossed the claim; however, on appeal in 2005 the appellate court reinstated the punitive damage claim against UIM.  Plaintiff was prepared to prove that UIM, which was responsible for MRI safety and training, had wantonly ignored safety practices in the MRI suite in allowing ferrous materials near the MRI magnet.

The punitive damage claim against UIM was a big, open item and had the jury agreed UIM should be punished then the assessment would likely have been several million dollars (it’s nearly always many, many multiples of the actual or compensatory damages awarded).

Emotional distress claims are recognized in New York courts for people not physically injured in an accident when they were within the “zone of danger” and feared for their own safety. When he rushed into the MRI suite after the oxygen tank hit his son, Mr. Colombini testified that he was indeed in fear. The appellate court, in its 2005 ruling in this case mentioned above, found that there was an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Colombini was in the zone of danger and he was permitted, therefore, to present his emotional distress claim before a jury at trial.

In a July 6, 2009 decision, though, the trial judge dismissed the emotional distress claim. The judge said that Mr. Colombini had not shown that the defendants owed him any duty of care and he had not shown he really feared for his own safety. This ruling was puzzling in that the judge reversed her own prior ruling in 2004 that allowed this claim to proceed.  Plaintiff’s counsel no doubt felt that had this case not settled then the father’s emotional distress claim would have been reinstated on appeal and that a very substantial sum would have been awarded directly to the father for his emotional distress.

The law firm of Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore is without question one of the top plaintiff’s medical malpractice law firms in New York. In this case, partners Thomas A. Moore and Matthew Gaier superbly represented the Colombini family and reached the best result that anyone could have. “Tommy” Moore has become a legendary figure in the New York courts on behalf of malpractice victims. It is not an exaggeration to say that in this case, the defendants paid top dollar and then some because Mr. Moore was ready to try the case. That’s not to say he’s infallible -- he has critics and, like anyone who tries many cases to verdicts, he's been defeated -- but it is to say that the $2,900,000 settlement in this case is probably more than would have been sustained on an appeal of a jury verdict in that amount or higher.

I pause before I close this post with a thought and a prayer for Michael Colombini and his wonderful family. They are good people who've suffered tragedy beyond words. May Michael's soul be bound up in the bond of eternal life and may his family know no more sorrow.

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Ramona Ulerio, a 36 year old homemaker, sustained serious back injuries when she slipped and fell down subway stairs in New York City on October 5, 2002. She sued the New York City Transit Authority claiming it was negligent in its maintenance of the stairway and that its negligence created a dangerous condition. She won her case five years later when a Bronx County jury ruled that it was a missing non-slip plate that caused the accident.

The subway station looked something like this:

The jury then calculated and awarded damages in the sum of $1,500,000, as follows:

• past medical expenses - $30,000
• future medical expenses - $381,322
• future custodial care - $441,163
• future rehabilitation expenses - $214,318
• future pain and suffering - $433,197

Each of the future periods was 20 years.

The transit authority appealed on the basis that the damages awarded were excessive but yesterday the appellate court affirmed the award in its entirety in Ulerio v. New York City Transit Authority (1^st Dept. 2010).

The case is significant and a big win for the plaintiff because Ms. Ulerio had sustained a previous back injury (also in a fall down accident) three years earlier. And her doctor recommended surgery for a disc at L5-S1 that was injured in the first accident. That very same disc was injured in the new accident, in addition to a disc at L4-L5.

So, the defendant argued at trial and on appeal that plaintiff’s injuries pre-existed and were not caused by the 2002 accident, noting also that Ms. Ulerio had even scheduled surgery for her back after the 1999 accident (although later canceled).

The defense urged that any treatment plaintiff claimed she’d need in the future was directly related to the old accident and injury. On the face of it, this sounds plausible; however, there were several facts that led the jury and the appellate judges to believe otherwise:  

• a doctor who treated plaintiff for both accidents testified that the first accident was minor and the second quite major,
• plaintiff was able to maintain all of her usual activities after the first accident but after the second accident she was rendered totally disabled

The treatment after the second accident included extensive physical therapy, epidural injections and two surgeries – a laminectomy at L4-L5 with bilateral foraminotomies and a bilateral laminectomy at L4-5, L5-S1 with L5-S1 fusion.

The L5-S1 fusion was clearly a new and huge injury and in that procedure the doctor fused the two vertebrae together fusing metal hardware and her back now looks like this:

Unfortunately, Ms. Ulerio remained at trial in unremitting pain (despite morphine) and unable to resume her household duties. She could not stand for more than 15 minutes, sleep at night, bathe or dress herself. She needed a cane to walk and wore a back brace at all times. She was diagnosed with failed back syndrome.

Ms. Ulerio’s need to incur future expenses was explained by testimony from her doctors and an economist who concluded that Ms. Ulerio  would require 40 years worth of physical therapy (30-50 times a year), pain management, household help (20 hours a week) and medical testing and care (including additional spine surgeries). They added it all up to more than $3,500,000. The jury agreed that these categories of future expenses would be required but only for 20 years and only in the total sum of about $1,000,000.

Inside Information:

• plaintiff was found to be 30% at fault for her accident so her total recovery is $1,050,000 (not $1,500,000)
• the jury clearly decided that the total verdict should be $1,500,000 and then it “backed into” that figure by awarding odd amounts for each category of damages
• plaintiff had before trial stopped going for physical therapy so the defense argued that there was no reason to believe she’d continue or need it in the future – plaintiff countered that the reason she stopped was she could not afford therapy and the jury’s award would allow this needed care in the future
• the future pain and suffering award ($433,197) was not challenged on appeal (and it would not have been modified downward anyway in view of case precedent we've discussed before, here and here
• the appeal of this important case was handled superbly by noted appellate counsel Brian Isaac

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On March 2, 2002 at about 5:30 p.m., Miguel Beato returned home from work as a porter. As he walked through the courtyard of his apartment complex at 35-46 65^th Street in the Woodside section of Queens, New York, he was confronted by an unknown gang of men. He asked them to move out of his way and they responded by with a 15 minute attack in which Miguel was beaten continuously and severely.

Beato faced a gang of hoods like this:

Beato sustained injuries all over his face, including:

• an orbital (eye socket) fracture
• a mid-face (depressing and caving in the area from the eye to the teeth) fracture
• a displaced eye
• a markedly displaced fractured nose that obliterated his sinus

The attackers fled but were caught, convicted and jailed. Beato, then 39 years old, sued the building owner claiming that the owner negligently failed to provide adequate security. A Queens County jury agreed and apportioned liability 75% to the owner and 25% to the attackers. Pain and suffering damages were then assessed at $5,000,000 ($1,500,000 past – 6 years, $3,500,000 future – 15 years). The trial judge then ruled that the award was excessive and should be reduced to $3,500,000 ($1,500,000 past, $2,000,000 future).

The building owner appealed arguing that there was no basis for any liability against it because the attack was neither foreseeable nor the result of any negligence on its part. Also, the defendant urged that the future pain and suffering award of $2,000,000 was still excessive (no challenge was made to the reasonableness of the $1,500,000 for past pain and suffering).

Last week, in Beato v. Cosmopolitan Associates, LLC, the appellate judges agreed with the defense and dismissed the entire case. Plaintiff’s testimony that he previously complained of loitering and suspected drug sales in the building lobby was ruled insufficient to establish the requirement that the assault was foreseeable.

The appellate judges in Beato did not address the arguments as to the reasonableness of the damage awards stating that in view of the dismissal on the merits those issues were academic. Here, though, we can and will address those issues and we do so with the benefit of the parties’ submissions to the court, including their briefs on appeal.

First, let’s take a look at some details as to the injuries in this case. The injuries are generically described above but here are their technical terms:

• comminuted fractures of both sides of his nasal bones
• comminuted fractures of his left orbital floor and nasal septum
• fractures of the left lamina papyracea and lateral superior wall extending to the frontal maxillary sinus and significant nasal lacerations

Blowout fractures are casued by direct trauma to the globe, like this:

If ever the term “getting his face punched in” applied, this is the case. Photographs of the plaintiff as he appeared shortly after the attack were shown to the jury (over defense objections) and no doubt they were stunned and sympathetic.

Now, let’s see what happened to Mr. Beato after the attack. He was immediately taken by ambulance to the hospital and admitted. He underwent two complex surgeries – one addressed the repair of his sinus and septum and the other consisted of open reduction and internal fixation of the orbital floor fracture.

At trial, six years after the incident, Beato had difficulty breathing due to his sinus injury, scars on his face and his surgeon stated he’d need additional surgeries to redo his nose, take out the plate and open his sinus and would have lifelong pain, difficulty breathing, physical and visible deformities and the need for narcotic pain medication.

It’s usual in injury cases that the defense will avail itself of its right to have the plaintiff examined by one or more doctors of its choosing to verify or dispute the severity (and causation) of a plaintiff’s injuries. The defense doctors are then usually called to testify at trial as to their findings. In this case, though, the defense chose to keep its doctors out of court and the plaintiff therefore sought and obtained a missing witness charge. That’s where the judge tells the jury that it may draw negative inferences from the defendant’s failure to call its own physicians. Clearly, that hurt the defense in this case and the jury accepted as true all of the dire future consequences testified to by plaintiff’s own doctors.

The defense gambled in this case in failing to call its doctors to testify and then after the verdict in declining to challenge the $1,500,000 past pain and suffering. In the end, the gamble paid off.

Before it did, though, there was substantial argument and disagreement over the propriety of the award for future pain and suffering. Would $2,000,000 have been sustained had liability not been overturned? I think not. There is a dearth of precedent as to sustained multi-million dollar verdicts for facial injury pain and suffering. Also, defense counsel claimed plaintiff made a good recovery and that plaintiff’s doctor’s claim that plaintiff would need lifelong pain medication was belied by the fact that at trial he took nothing more than over the counter antihistamine.

We’ve reviewed facial injury cases, here, especially several in the $200,000 to $500,000 range.

There are very few cases awarding $1,000,000 or more for facial injury pain and suffering. Here are some:

• Simon v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc. (2^nd Dept. 1986) - $1,000,000 for loss of eye following car accident
• Stiuso v. City of New York (2^nd Dept. 1996) - $1,750,000 ($1,000,000 past – 4 years, $750,000 future – 15 years) for loss of an eye and fractured jaw
• Storms v. Vargas (2^nd Dept. 1998) - $4,000,000 ($3,000,000 past – 10 years, $1,000,000 future – 32 years) for 31 year old police officer in car accident who sustained crush fractures all over his face requiring 26 separate surgical procedures and 16 one week or more hospitalizations prior to trial and was left with an artificial eye, limited vision and the need for additional surgeries once every two years for life

Without minimizing what Mr. Beato went through and will be left with for his life, it appears that had Beato's $2,000,000 future pain and suffering verdict been reviewed by the appellate court it would have been reduced substantially given the case law discussed above and especially in view of Storms v. Vargas where the injuries appear to be much more severe.

Inside Information:

• the jurors appear to have been confused in that plaintiff offered proof of $52,000 in medical expenses incurred to the date of trial but the jury awarded $250,000 for that element of damages
• further evidence of juror confusion: they awarded $1,500,000 for future medical expenses but the trial judge reduced that sum to $200,000 as the doctors’ testimony as to the costs future treatment justified no more than that
• had liability been upheld, the defendant would have had to pay the entire damages award even though the jury found others (the criminals) were 25% at fault and that’s because under New York’s CPLR Article 16 a defendant in this type of case will be liable for the full damage award when found to be 50% or more at fault

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